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Abstract 
 
In recent years there has been an increasing focus on virtual organizations, alliances, networks 
and supply chain management as tools through which companies can achieve competitive 
advantage. Innovation has become another important factor for achieving competitive 
advantage, especially in markets where the macroeconomic conditions are unfavorable, with 
high wage and high tax. This paper is an empirical investigation of how companies can achieve 
innovation through contracting, on a general level. The paper attempts to identify contract 
mechanisms which will foster suppliers’ innovativeness.  
The research in this paper was done by conducting a quantitative study. The investigation 
method was testing the dependent variable, supplier innovativeness, in relation to several 
independent variables; pay-for-performance, detailed contract, competition and close supplier 
relationships.  
The findings showed a significant positive effect of detailed contracts on suppliers’ 
innovativeness. Another finding from the research was that a close relationship with the supplier 
will be important for innovation. Close supplier relationships and a detailed contract was found 
to be complementary variables, and both will contribute to suppliers being more innovative. A 
surprising finding from this study was that reward schemes based on performance was not found 
to promote suppliers’ innovativeness. This is a finding that contradicts other small studies of 
performance based contracts and innovation. A close supplier relationship stands out from the 
findings as the key mechanism to foster supplier innovativeness.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This study want to examine how contract mechanisms can function as tools to promote 
innovation in a buyer-supplier relationship. The study will look at factors that may foster 
supplier innovativeness. This introductory section provides a background for the study and 
presents the research question that will be further examined. This introductory section will also 
outline the layout for the rest of the paper.  
 
1.1 Background 
During recent years, there has been an increasing focus on alliances, networks and supply chain 
management as tools through which firms can achieve competitive advantage(Dyer, Cho, & 
Chu, 1998). Companies are spending much money and resources on purchasing goods & 
services. The purchasing cost as a percentage of sales revenue is increasing as a result of 
companies outsourcing more(Dyer et al., 1998).  Consequently, supply chain management and 
purchasing performance is increasingly identified as important for companies’ success and 
competitive advantage. As a result of companies outsourcing more, supply chain management 
has become a growing field of study during recent years. Effective contract management is an 
important element in the supply chain.   
For companies operating in markets where the macroeconomic conditions are unfavorable, such 
as high wage and high tax, innovation has become another important factor for survival 
(Schiele, 2006). The companies operating in Central Europe are experiencing these types of 
challenges, and innovation has become important to achieve success. The Norwegian market is 
one of the markets that is characterized by having both high wage and high tax. It becomes 
important that companies are able to adapt and evolve if they wish to survive(Trott, 2008). The 
ability to change and adapt is important for survival and competitive advantage. For many 
companies to gain competitive advantage, innovation should be something to strive for.  
The idea of innovation is widely accepted. Innovation has become a common core value of 
many companies – Perhaps used so much that it verges on becoming a cliché? However, even 
though the term ‘innovation’ is often used and known, to what extent do the companies fully 
understand the concept? Innovation management rises as important for organizing your 
company for innovation. 
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Innovation management has changed during the last decade, because of companies’ growing 
reliance on external sources of technology(Schiele, 2006). Consequently, it becomes crucial for 
companies to integrate innovation focus in the purchasing of goods and services. Companies 
needs to identify which suppliers that actually do have a high potential to contribute to the 
innovativeness of the company. Companies also has to attract these suppliers in the pre-bid 
phase of the tendering process. Identifying innovative suppliers has become a new task for 
purchasing(Schiele, 2006). Since companies are outsourcing more to external suppliers, it 
becomes interesting to understand how companies can achieve innovation through contracting.  
The rapid development and progress in information technology have made it possible for 
companies to easily exchange data and coordinate activities. This has contributed to the 
increasing trend that several individual companies choose to outsource their activities to an 
array of partners. The outsourcing of different activities creates a network of companies, where 
some are buyers, some suppliers, and some both. The term for this network is called a virtual 
organization(H. W. Chesbrough & Teece, 1996).  
Sourcing can be defined as the process of identifying companies capable of supplying the goods 
or services needed by the buying company(Obal, 2011).  Because of the current situation where 
many companies choose to outsource several activities, it becomes relevant to study how 
companies can achieve best practice procurement. In recent years, the market also demands 
more frequent innovation, which leads to it being important for companies to understand how 
they can achieve innovation in the products or services they have contracted to suppliers. To 
gain a better understanding of how companies can obtain innovation through contracting, it 
becomes important to study contracts, the procurement process and theory from innovation 
management.  
 
1.2 Presentation of Research Problem 
This paper will investigate how companies can achieve supplier innovativeness through 
contracting. Most companies outsource several functions, and it can be important to ensure that 
the functions outsourced are still open to innovation. How can companies ensure that they 
promote supplier innovativeness? How should companies then construct their contracts to be 
open for innovation? What is the most effective relationship between a company and their 
supplier when the goal is to obtain innovative deliveries? These are the central questions that 
will be analyzed in this paper. 
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1.3 The Layout of this Paper 
The paper is organized in 5 sections. Section 2 is devoted to a review of the theory that is the 
basis for this master thesis. Section 3 will present the methodology for this paper, including 
development of measures and research design. In section 4 the results will be presented. Section 
5 carries out the discussion, analysis and conclusion. The paper will end with proposals for 
further research, and limitations for this paper. Figure 1 illustrates the layout for the paper.  
 
Figure 1: The Layout of this Paper 
 
  
Introduction Theory Methodology Results
Discussion 
and 
Conclusion
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2. Theory and Literature Review 
 
In order to gain a basis for analysis and discussion on how companies can achieve innovation 
through contracting, we need to study theory related to contract mechanisms and innovation 
management. The purpose of this section is to build a theoretical foundation for the empirical 
research in this paper. First there will be a presentation of Contract Theory. Second, Innovation 
Management Theory will be presented, and the section will at last finish with the research model 
and the hypotheses for this paper.  
 
2.1 Contract Theory 
A contract is legally defined as an offer, which is accepted and negotiated for 
consideration(Obal, 2011). A contract may be oral or in writing. Contracts represent promises 
or obligations to perform particular actions in the future(Macneil, 1977). 
Contracts are helpful tools for the company, to ensure that they receive the right services or 
goods when they need it, and that it matches the company’s specifications as promised by the 
supplier. Contracts also protect the supplier as the specific supplier investment to a particular 
procurement will not be ‘wasted’ in the sense that the company is obligated to buy what they 
ordered as stated in the contract(Dimitri, Piga, & Spagnolo, 2006). Hence, a contract may be 
beneficial for both the buyer and the supplier.  
Contracting can in some cases lead to the company having a weakened innovative 
capacity(Domberger, 1998). If the contract is formulated in a way that makes it hard for the 
company to deliver an innovative product it leads the company to have a weakened innovative 
capacity. However, there are several examples of companies which have not lost their capacity 
of delivering new products and new processes to market(Domberger, 1998). Companies should 
encourage and assist their contractors to improve their products and services through 
innovation. This can be done between contracts, but also within the life of an existing 
contract(Domberger, 1998).  In order to ensure that incentives to innovate are not suppressed, 
companies need to have properly structured incentive contracts(Domberger, 1998).  
 
2.1.1 The Contracting Decision Tree 
Figure 2, The Contracting Decision Tree is a theoretical framework that is made to briefly 
analyze the contracting decision(Domberger & Rimmer, 1994). What functions should 
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companies outsource and what should they keep in-house? This framework shows the decision 
to contract in the terms of the economic evaluation that must precede it. Deciding if a company 
should contract or not is an important process that should be done thoroughly. The Contracting 
Decision Tree is described with three steps that must be taken into account in order to determine 
the decision to contract a good or service. The Contracting Decision Tree helps to determine 
whether it is efficient or not to contract a service. Its purpose is to help companies in the decision 
of determining which functions they should have in-house and which it would be wise to 
outsource to external suppliers.  
 
 
Figure 2: Contracting Decision Tree 
 
The first step involves identifying potential suppliers. The economic rationality of the search 
for potential suppliers is to see whether contracting is likely to be feasible(Domberger & 
Rimmer, 1994). In order to see if the contracting is feasible, there are different criteria that 
needs to be fulfilled. These criteria involve a supplier that has productive activities and is 
efficient and effective. If the contracting organization thinks suppliers can fulfil these criteria 
the process of contracting can start(Domberger & Rimmer, 1994). If the suppliers are not able 
to fulfill the needs, the production continues in-house. When trying to achieve innovation, it is 
important that potential suppliers have high technical capabilities, which will be further 
discussed in section 2.2.4 Suppliers’ Technical Capabilities. If companies want to achieve 
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innovation in supplies, it is essential that they investigate the supplier market before 
determining if the service should be outsourced or not.  
The second step in the contracting decision is the determination if the tendering process can 
be made competitive(Domberger & Rimmer, 1994). In the public sector companies are 
concerned about uncompetitive and collusive bidding behavior by contractors. The private 
sector often negotiate contracts directly with suppliers without going through a bidding 
process. When it comes to achieving innovation, competition may be an efficient mean to 
foster innovativeness(Domberger, 1998). However, close supplier relationships will also 
positively affect innovation(Song & Di Benedetto, 2008). The effect of close supplier 
relationships on innovation will be further described in section 2.2.3 The Connection between 
Supplier Relationships and Innovation and the effect of competition on supplier 
innovativeness will be discussed in section 2.1.8 Competition.  
The third step in the figure involves the transaction costs of contracting(Domberger & Rimmer, 
1994). These costs include the cost of organizing and assessing the bids, the costs of designing 
the contract, negotiation and the monitoring and enforcement costs. If these costs does exceed 
the cost of keeping the service in-house there is no point in continuing the contracting 
process(Domberger & Rimmer, 1994). When evaluating the in-house versus contracting the 
service, the company must consider the total cost of contracting against the savings they likely 
will achieve. The next section will define transaction costs, and give a brief understanding of 
how this connects to supplier innovativeness.  
 
2.1.2 Contracts Should Minimize Transaction Costs 
Contracts is a form of governance that should try to minimize transaction costs. Transaction 
cost is the cost of making a contract and managing the relationship between a company and 
their supplier(Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). A general principle is that the more complex the 
contracts tend to be, the higher management costs are associated(Dimitri et al., 2006). There 
cannot be efficient procurement without efficient contract management(Dimitri et al., 2006). 
Transaction cost deals with the best generic decisions for organizing one particular 
transaction(Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). There are two central assumptions in transaction cost 
theory of contracting(Mayer & Argyres, 2004). The two assumptions are that when negotiating 
and designing contracts the agents are (1) unable to anticipate all possible situations that can 
affect the relationship between the company and supplier and (2) they are able to predict major 
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contract risks by their contractual partners. Because they are able to predict the risks they can 
prepare contract structures to reduce them(Mayer & Argyres, 2004). Transaction cost theory 
makes equilibrium predictions with having a competitive environment(Mayer & Argyres, 
2004). This means that firms with mis-designed contracts fail to learn quickly and will perform 
poorly in the market. If a company constantly perform poorly they will be forced to exit the 
market. Companies with well-designed contracts are more likely to survive. Having a detailed 
and formal contract can lead to a close relationship to the supplier(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Close supplier relationships can lead to supplier innovativeness(Song & Di Benedetto, 2008). 
However, close supplier relationships can also lead to higher transaction costs(Domberger, 
1998). The firm should investigate if the extra transaction costs will be gained through the 
possible achievement of innovative supplies.  
 
2.1.3 Fixed-Fee, Cost-Plus and Hybrid Contracts 
We can distinguish between three types of contracts; Fixed-fee, cost-plus and hybrid 
contracts(Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). Fixed-fee contracts are also known as lump sum contracts 
or fixed price contracts. This type of contract consists of a lump-sum payment for a completed 
service that has been specified in the contract(Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). Fixed-fee contracts are 
different from cost-plus contracts. In cost-plus contracts the company pay the supplier an 
hourly/daily/weekly rate for the time spent on a particular task plus the expenses the supplier 
uses on materials(Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). This type of contract is also known as a T&M 
contract, where ‘T’ is for time and ‘M’ is for material. The third type of contract is hybrid 
contract which is a contract type in between fixed-fee contracts and cost-plus contracts.  A cost 
reimbursable contract, which is also called a T&M contract with a cap, is a form of hybrid 
contract. By placing a cap on a T&M contract, you achieve a hybrid contract that combines the 
fixed-cost and the cost-plus contract type(Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). In some literature this 
contract type is also known as incentive contracts(Dimitri et al., 2006). An incentive contract 
pays a fixed-fee in addition to some fraction of project cost(Dimitri et al., 2006). The amount 
of profit or payable fee that comes with the contract relates to the supplier’s performance. This 
contract type is also known as a performance based contract, because the supplier is paid based 
on its performance. Hybrid contracts fall in between the cost plus contracts and the fixed-fee 
contracts.  
Several procurement contracts are often a combination of these three broad categories; Fixed-
fee, cost-plus and hybrid contracts. The combination contracts can specify incentives on some 
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aspects and fixed-prices on other aspects, and combining contract types in order to adapt the 
contract to the specific circumstances faced by the procurer(Dimitri et al., 2006). Choosing a 
type of contract is complicated, because there are pros and cons in every contract for both the 
company and the supplier. In a fixed-fee contract, the supplier is provided with strong incentives 
to operate efficiently because they hold all the cost overruns. This type of contract also allows 
the supplier to keep the results if there occurs any cost savings. This creates strong incentives 
for the supplier to search for changes in technology or look for input prices that can lower costs. 
A result of this is that a fixed-fee contract may create an incentive to innovate(Kalnins & Mayer, 
2004). Domberger (1998) argues that a properly structured incentive contract is the best for 
achieving innovation. Incentives can be made through bonuses or other sanctions based on i.e. 
performance. The next section will cover theory on contracts that are called performance based 
contracts, where you have a pay-for-performance scheme in the contract. Pay-for-performance 
is also one of the variables that will be further researched later in this paper.   
 
2.1.4 Pay-for-Performance 
Pay-for-performance is a contract scheme that links payment and performance. This scheme 
assumes that rewarding the performance will help motivate the supplier to deliver a better 
result(Ganesan, George, Jap, Palmatier, & Weitz, 2009). In contract theory, Pay-for-
Performance is also known as Performance Based Contracts(Sumo, van der Valk, & van Weele, 
2012). Pay-for-performance includes the supplier to act in the interest of their buyer, by building 
incentives for the supplier. It is expected that pay-for-performance should lead to the supplier 
being more engaged to do a better job or new activities that will improve their 
performance(Sumo, van der Valk, van Weele, & Bode, 2014).  Pay-for-performance should 
create an incentive for the supplier to perform better, because the better they perform the more 
they are paid. Pay-for-performance and Performance Based Contracts therefore expect that the 
supplier will be more innovative(Sumo et al., 2014). Sumo et al (2014) found a significant 
positive effect of pay-for-performance on supplier innovativeness. The same authors published 
an article in 2012 concerning Performance Based Contracts(Sumo et al., 2012). In the article 
from 2012 they suggest that one should empirically test the relationship between Pay-for-
Performance and innovation, because this a relatively unexplored field of study. Research on 
how contracts affect performance is limited, and especially for supplier innovativeness. Pay-
for-performance in relation to innovation is one of the variables that will be further studied in 
this paper. In 2014 Sumo et al conducted a study that found that pay for performance contributes 
  Page 16 of 84 
 
to supplier innovativeness, and it will be interesting to see if the same effect will be found in a 
different study that has different population and respondent profile.  
 
2.1.5 Detailed Contracts 
What drives companies to draft detailed contracts? Companies that are more collectivist, more 
likely to avoid uncertainty, and more tolerant of power distance in the supply chain show a 
greater propensity to write detailed contracts(Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Detailed contracts 
should be formulated to open innovation. Contract flexibility is important to open up for new 
suppliers and new solutions. Contract flexibility will depend on the use of specifications in the 
contract. Specifications are the description of the product or service that are being procured, 
and can be seen as a mean of conducting dialogue in the development process between a 
company and their supplier (Kaulio, 1996; Nellore, 2001). Specifications are written and 
contained in a contract. There are several ways of using specifications in contracts. A very 
detailed specification may reduce competition. Performance-based specification and functional 
specification may be better to maintain competition. Specifications can therefore have a direct 
impact on competition, and competition innovation(Domberger, 1998).  This means that 
companies must be aware that by having a very detailed specification in the contract, it may 
reduce the probability of achieving innovation. The impact of competition on supplier 
innovativeness will be further examined later in this paper. First in section 2.1.8 Competition. 
As already stated, in order to achieve good procurement it is essential to optimize the use of 
specifications in contracts(Asmus & Griffin, 1993). The more complex the contract is, the 
greater the specification needed(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Poppo and Zenger (2002) were the 
first to empirically explore a complementary relationship between relational governance and 
formal contracts. Their study found that managers tend to employ greater levels of norms as 
their contracts become more and more customized. Poppo and Zenger (2002) also suggest that 
these customized contracts will reduce the possibility for the parties to act opportunistic. More 
importantly, their findings show that contractual complexity and relational governance function 
as complements in explaining satisfaction with exchange performance. This means that formal 
contracts, together with relational governance, may lead to a greater chance of achieving 
supplier innovativeness. The relationship between detailed contracting and supplier 
innovativeness will be further studied later in this paper.  
 
  Page 17 of 84 
 
2.1.6 Arm’s Length Contracts vs Long-Term Relationships  
The relationship between the company and the supplier play an important role in the company’s 
ability to change(Hoyt & Huq, 2000). Is the relationship is too restrictive; flexibility will be 
difficult to achieve. We can distinguish between two different supplier management models; 
arm’s length relationships and close supplier relationships(Dyer et al., 1998). The traditional 
model of supplier management is arm’s length relationships. Arm’s length relationships aims 
to minimize the dependence on suppliers and to maximize the companies’ bargaining 
power(Dyer et al., 1998).  Michael Porter explains that in the arm’s length model, purchases of 
an item can be spread among different suppliers in such a way as to improve the firm’s 
bargaining power (Porter, 1980). The buyers purposely keep the suppliers at arm’s length to 
avoid any commitment. The arm’s length way of managing supplier relationships was 
previously widely accepted as best practice for supplier management in the United States, until 
the Japanese success(Dyer et al., 1998). A partner model of supplier management is in contrast 
to the arm’s length model. The success of Japanese firms has often been attributed to close 
supplier relationship(Dyer et al., 1998). The success of close supplier relationship are often 
explained by firms sharing more information and have better coordination on tasks. In a close 
supplier relationship, firms often rely on trust to govern the relationship, which lead to lower 
transaction costs(Dyer et al., 1998). However, it is worth to mention that studies have shown 
that formal contracts and relational governance can work as complements(Poppo & Zenger, 
2002). It means that a formal contract does not necessarily exclude relational governance and a 
close supplier relationship. In fact, a formal contract can be positive for achieving a close 
relationship with your supplier(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Since a close supplier relationship 
leads to the buyer and supplier sharing more information and having better coordination 
between them, it may be likely that a close supplier relationship can foster innovation.  As 
mentioned, the relationship between the company and their supplier will be important for the 
company’s ability to change(Hoyt & Huq, 2000). This paper will later examine if having a close 
relationship with your supplier will lead to the supplier being more innovative.  
 
2.1.7 The Procurement Process 
Procurement is a complex process that at times is hard to define, understand and manage. 
Effective procurement of goods and services contributes to the competitive advantage for a 
company(Novack & Simco, 1991). The procurement process links all the members in the 
supply chain and takes upon itself the responsibility for assuring and managing the quality of 
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suppliers in that particular chain. Companies faces several options and challenges at different 
stages of procurement(Dimitri et al., 2006). First, the company must decide on what exactly 
should be procured, and on how to transmit and communicate those needs to potential suppliers. 
Second comes the contract which must be constructed to include contractual obligations and 
methods of compensation. Another important decision is the choice of how the company should 
award the procurement(Dimitri et al., 2006). The choice of how to communicate your needs to 
potential suppliers and how to award the procurement are stages in the tendering process. The 
tendering process is the process of choosing the best company to supply goods or services. 
Competitive tendering is done by asking several companies to make offers for supplying the 
goods or services. The tendering can be open for all suppliers or restricted to only a few selected 
suppliers who can participate in the bidding. It is important to analyze how to best design the 
tendering process to achieve innovation in contracting. 
Virke is a Norwegian organization that has tried to answer the question of how one should 
design the tendering process to give room for innovation. They arranged a seminar between 
purchasers and suppliers in different types of industries, which tried to assess this question. 
They concluded that for companies to achieve innovative deliveries, , the purchasers in 
companies should establish arenas for ongoing dialogue with the suppliers(Virke, 2014). 
Virke’s research showed that the situation today is that companies and suppliers usually only 
have a dialogue when it is related to a specific tender/purchase. Other research supports Virke’s 
conclusion that early supplier integration in new product development might be an effective 
approach for achieving innovation(Schiele, 2010). Another finding from Virke’s seminar was 
that the companies should use less technical specifications in their ‘Invitation to tender’. The 
companies should instead use a demand-driven specification, which gives the suppliers more 
room for submitting an innovative solution to the companies’ problem.   
 
2.1.8 Competition 
In contracting you can choose between several tendering formats. The tendering format can be 
important for the level of competition in the procurement process. The tendering formats are 
mainly defined according to the possibility for bidders to improve their bids; dynamic, auction 
vs. sealed-bid tendering(Dimitri et al., 2006). In sealed-bid tendering suppliers submit their 
offer without observing the tenders made by the opponents. In dynamic auctions prices are 
released in order to accentuate competition. Suppliers then have the opportunity to outbid the 
rivals before the auction ends.   
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We can distinguish between two types of procurement mechanisms; competitive tendering and 
negotiation(Dimitri et al., 2006). Competitive tendering is a procedure that increase 
competition. This procedure invites many potential suppliers from different venues to submit a 
tender. The communication between buyers and sellers is normally prevented which can 
improve price and quality(Dimitri et al., 2006). Open competitive tendering is also known to 
prevent corruption because the procedure is transparent and open(Dimitri et al., 2006). 
Competitive tendering is becoming an important management tool in both the private and public 
sectors. By having a competitive tendering, you are looking for the best possible supplier to do 
a job for you to the best possible price. Competitive tendering or informal market testing tries 
to determine which is the preferred supplier on the basis of price and non-price 
criteria(Domberger & Rimmer, 1994).  
Instead of using competitive tendering, the company can search the market for suppliers that 
are able and reputable to do the job, and then negotiate with one chosen supplier(Dimitri et al., 
2006). Negotiations allows the procurer to exchange information with potential suppliers. By 
negotiation they can utilize their expertise when designing a project(Dimitri et al., 2006). The 
negotiation method is especially used for valuable or complex contracts(Dzeng & Lin, 2004). 
When the company and the supplier negotiates, they discuss issues such as price, terms of 
payment, and delivery. The issues negotiated are determined at the beginning of the negotiation, 
but new issues may arise during the process. When both parties agree on the options and price 
the negotiation ends.  
Competition can foster innovation(Domberger, 1998). Economists have long debated whether 
monopoly or competition is most suitable for achieving innovation, and the evidence favors 
competition as the best engine for innovation(Domberger, 1998). In bidding situations for 
contracts, innovation allows suppliers to provide improved solutions at better prices than their 
competitors(Domberger, 1998). Competition therefore stands out as a tool to achieve innovative 
deliveries from suppliers. Then it becomes important to design the procurement strategy in a 
way that secure competition.  
Collusion between suppliers is a threat for competition(Dimitri et al., 2006).  Coordination may 
be both tempting and feasible for suppliers, since most procurements are repeated over time. 
There are many means to lowering the threat of collusion and securing competition between 
suppliers. If the risk of collusion is high, it would be wise for the company to favor a longer 
contract length(Dimitri et al., 2006).  Collusion is more likely to emerge in a stable and 
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predictable environment, and companies should therefore frequently change the design of the 
competitive bidding(Dimitri et al., 2006). 
In the Japanese automobile industry you can find a sourcing strategy that is characterized by 
long term contractual relationships with carefully chosen subcontractors(Domberger, 1998). 
This is an alternative to the use of formal competitive tendering processes. Having long term 
contractual relationships emphasize performance and product innovation(Domberger, 1998). 
These relationships in the Japanese automobile industry typically involve more than one 
subcontractor. The system a of contract is referred to as ‘multiple sourcing’, or more specifically 
‘parallel sourcing’(Domberger, 1998). In parallel sourcing two or more suppliers are used to 
supply similar services in a way that their performances can be directly compared(Domberger, 
1998). This means that the suppliers are given competitive incentives for performance.  
This paper will further study if competition is a factor that will positively influence the chance 
of a supplier being innovative.  
 
2.2 Innovation Management Theory 
In recent years the market demands more frequent innovation. The purpose of innovation is to 
create new business. Companies must be able to adapt and evolve in order to survive. A major 
benchmarking study from 2005 found some specific factors that distinguish the leaders from 
the followers in procurement(Goffre, Plaizier, & Schade, 2005).  One of the key findings on 
what separates successful companies from underperforming companies, is their commitment to 
innovation through purchasing. Successful companies commit to innovation and involve their 
suppliers at early stages of new product development(Goffre et al., 2005). From this we can 
conclude that a company’s competitive position is influenced by its capabilities to engage in a 
network approach to innovation. This section will look more closely on theory regarding 
innovation, to gain a better understanding of what factors that may foster supplier 
innovativeness. 
 
2.2.1 Open Innovation 
The last few years, there has been an increasing focus on innovation through an ‘open 
innovation’ perspective(Hüttinger, 2011). ‘Open innovation’ states that innovations are 
developed through the interplay of different parties from different organizations.  Dr. Henry 
Chesbrough defines ‘Open Innovation’ to be a paradigm that assumes that companies can and 
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should use external as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market as they 
look to advance their technology(H. Chesbrough, 2006). A study by Roberts (2001) collected 
data from several of the largest R&D-performing companies in North America, Western Europe 
and Japan. This study showed that companies worldwide continue to shift toward acquiring 
more key technology from outside, relying increasingly upon universities for research and on 
joint ventures and alliances for development (Roberts, 2001). The study shows that there is a 
presence of a shift towards an ‘open innovation’ model. This suggests that suppliers play an 
increasing role in the innovation process. For companies to achieve innovation we can see that 
they are increasingly turning to suppliers, researchers and other partners to access 
innovations(Johnsen, 2009). It indicates that it will be important to study how companies’ best 
can achieve innovation through contracting, and in the next sections we will go further into 
innovation management theory, first looking at what distinguishes autonomous vs. systemic 
innovations. The sections will also include the connection between supplier relationship and 
innovativeness, and how suppliers’ technical capabilities affect their ability to innovate.  
 
2.2.2 Autonomous vs. Systemic Innovations 
We can distinguish between several types of innovation. Some innovations are autonomous, 
which means that they can be pursued independently from other innovations(H. W. Chesbrough 
& Teece, 1996). Other innovations are fundamentally systemic, which is in contrast to 
autonomous innovations. Systemic innovations can be realized only in conjunction with related, 
complementary innovations(H. W. Chesbrough & Teece, 1996). In other words, when 
innovation depends on a series of interdependent innovations, we define the innovation to be 
systemic. It is important to distinguish between autonomous and systemic innovation, because 
the distinction is essential for the choice of organizational design(H. W. Chesbrough & Teece, 
1996).  A company must decide if they should organize for innovation by using decentralized 
approaches or if they should rely on their internal organization. When the innovation is 
characterized as being autonomous, the decentralized virtual organization can manage the 
development and commercialization quite well(H. W. Chesbrough & Teece, 1996). However, 
when an innovation is systemic, the different subcontractors are dependent on one another, over 
whom they have no control. Systemic innovations are often complex, but they are important to 
create valuable business breakthroughs. Systemic innovations encounter more management 
challenges regarding information exchange, because systemic innovations require information 
sharing and coordinated adjustment throughout the whole product system(H. W. Chesbrough 
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& Teece, 1996). Chesbrough and Teece (1996) argue that loose partnerships of companies will 
produce more conflict of interest than what centrally managed companies do, and those 
conflicts may inhibit systemic innovations. The different companies involved in the systemic 
innovation may be linked through ‘arm’s length contracts, and it may be lack of information 
exchange between them which will lead to bad coordination on the systemic innovation. When 
companies are deciding what to outsource, they should look at the autonomy of the operation. 
Autonomous innovation will be more suitable for outsourcing.  
 
2.2.3 The Connection between Supplier Relationships and Innovations 
Studies of supplier relationships and innovations, show that greater supplier involvement 
benefits innovation(Song & Di Benedetto, 2008). All purchases done by a buyer from a supplier 
naturally gives rise to a relationship between the two parties, which sometimes is a contractual 
one. Since the concept ‘Just in time’ became a widespread concept, a ‘close supplier 
relationship’ has become more important. The ‘Just in time’ concept has required a close 
supplier relationship in some areas especially; quality, communications and product 
improvement(Obal, 2011). It is widely acknowledged that a poor relationships between buyers 
and suppliers create barriers to innovation(Domberger, 1998). This is because when you have 
a distant relationship with your supplier, you hinder the transfer of knowledge between the two 
parties. Antagonistic relationships between buyers and suppliers may lead to lower purchasing 
costs(Domberger, 1998). Perhaps the gains of a close supplier relationship in terms of the 
possibility to achieve innovative deliveries may outweigh the additional purchasing costs 
associated with this type of supplier relationship.  
Studies of supplier relationships have also found that the phenomenon ‘preferred customer 
status’ positively influences supplier innovativeness(Hüttinger, 2011). ‘Preferred customer 
status’ is defined by Steinle and Schiele (2008) as a situation where the supplier offers the buyer 
preferential resource allocation(Steinle & Schiele, 2008). This finding indicates that companies 
should consider to allocate resources to what we call reverse marketing, in order to enhance 
their level of customer attractiveness. If the company manage to be an interesting customer for 
suppliers, the suppliers will pay more attention and loyalty towards your company(Hüttinger, 
2011). It will also promote an open dialogue which leads to the exchange of knowledge, which 
again can provide the basis for inter-organizational innovative capabilities(Hüttinger, 2011). 
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2.2.4 Suppliers’ Technical Capabilities Enhance Supplier Innovativeness 
Research has shown that suppliers’ technical capabilities positively influences supplier 
innovativeness(Hüttinger, 2011). This finding implies that it is important to carefully select 
capable suppliers before entering a contract situation and carefully select which suppliers who 
should be invited to participate in a tendering process. If the tendering process is designed as 
open tendering, without limitations of which suppliers who can participate, then the company 
should be aware that it is important to attract suppliers with strong technical capabilities in order 
to have a greater possibility of achieving innovation. The composition of an ITT (invitation to 
tender) will have an impact on which suppliers the company attracts to submit a bid. If a 
company chooses to go out on request for a total supplier, instead of dividing the work into lots, 
the company will find less suppliers capable of submitting a bid. However, if the company 
chooses to divide the contract into too many lots, it will encounter the risk of not attracting the 
larger suppliers in the market(Dimitri et al., 2006). Attracting the right suppliers to participate 
in a tender process, or choosing the right supplier to outsource to, will be important for 
achieving innovative deliveries. This is because the supplier’s technical capabilities will affect 
supplier innovativeness(Hüttinger, 2011). Companies need to identify technical capable 
suppliers to outsource to, in order to facilitate for innovation. 
 
2.3 Theory – Conclusions  
Choosing the most suitable contract type is essential to effective procurement. Dimitri et al 
(2006) argue that contract flexibility, the incentives for quality and cost reduction, and the 
allocation of procurement risk are the most important dimensions influencing the purchaser’s 
choice of the procurement contract. This paper wants to emphasize supplier innovativeness as 
the most important dimension to obtain through contracting.   
Contract theory shows that fixed fee contracts may create a stronger incentive to be innovative, 
than cost-plus contracts do(Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). Fixed-fee contracts at least creates a very 
strong incentives for the supplier to search for changes in technology or look for input prices 
that can lower costs, because the supplier gets to keep the results if there occurs any cost 
savings. This is because the possible cost-reduction the supplier can achieve by using new 
technology or come up with new solutions. However, if fixed-fee contracts are going to be 
effective in promoting innovation, contract flexibility is essential. The contract must be 
designed in a way that makes room for suppliers to deliver new solutions. Companies should 
therefore specify needs based on functionality, not technical specifications. That will give the 
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suppliers room for providing new solutions for the company needs. It is crucial to note that not 
all contracts should specify needs based on functionality. It depends on the nature of the supply 
and the complexity of the contract. Some supplies require a detailed technical specification.  
Studies show that close supplier relationships can contribute to innovativeness(Song & Di 
Benedetto, 2008). Open exchange of knowledge and ideas will help to promote an environment 
for innovation. A close supplier relationship, as in contrast to an arms-length relationship, can 
lead to a greater chance of achieving innovation from the supplier. Research studied also 
suggests that it is important for companies to have a preferred customer status amongst 
suppliers(Hüttinger, 2011). A preferred customer status will contribute to a closer supplier 
relationship, which again can enhance innovation. Close supplier relationship in relation to 
supplier innovativeness is one of the hypotheses that will be tested in this paper.  
Studies have found a complementary relationship between formal contracts and relational 
governance(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Based on the findings from Poppo & Zenger (2002) we 
expect that detailed contracts and close supplier relationship may be complementary to each 
other, and that both will positively influence supplier innovativeness. This paper will further 
investigate if a detailed contract can contribute the suppliers’ innovativeness, and will also test 
the relationship between formal contracts and close supplier relationship.  
Competition is another factor that is expected to give suppliers the incentive to come up with 
new and better solutions(Domberger, 1998). Fostering competition will therefore be essential 
in the procurement process. Research have also shown that suppliers’ technical capabilities are 
important to achieve innovation in contracting(Hüttinger, 2011). These two factors implies that 
companies need to not only foster competition in the procurement process; they also need to 
attract the right suppliers. Based on Domberger (1998) we expect that competition will have a 
positive effect on supplier innovativeness, and this will be further researched as a hypothesis in 
this paper.  
As previously stated close supplier relationship is believed to promote supplier 
innovativeness(Song & Di Benedetto, 2008). The immediate thought is that competition and 
close supplier relationship will be two variables in conflict. Both competition and close supplier 
relationships’ impact on innovation will be closer studied later in this paper, including the 
relationship between the two variables. The expected positive impact of competition on 
innovation is solely based on theory by Domberger (1998). Therefore this is an interesting 
variable to test. It is especially interesting because of the anticipated relationship between 
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competition and close supplier relationship. It seems likely that the two variables will be in 
conflict, because it may be hard to have a close supplier relationship and at the same time 
maintain competition. This relationship will also be tested in this paper.   
Pay-for-performance should lead to the supplier being more engaged to do a better job or new 
activities that will improve their performance(Sumo et al., 2014).  Pay-for-performance should 
create an incentive for the supplier to perform better, because the better they perform the more 
they are paid. Pay-for-performance and Performance Based Contracts therefore expect that the 
supplier will be more innovative(Sumo et al., 2014). Sumo et al (2014) found a significant 
positive effect of pay-for-performance on supplier innovativeness. However, performance 
based contracts and innovation is a field of study that is relatively unexplored. This paper will 
have pay-for-performance as one of the variables to study in relation to supplier innovativeness.  
 
2.4 Research Model and Hypotheses Development 
From the section of Theory and Literature Review we looked at the theoretical foundation for 
this paper. Based on the theoretical foundation we have identified and concluded on some 
factors which we believe will be important for achieving innovation through contracting. This 
section will present the research model to be studied further in the paper, together with testable 
hypotheses. The selected factors which will be the variables studied more closely are how pay-
for-performance, a detailed contract, competition and a close supplier relationship will effect 
supplier innovativeness.  
 
2.4.1 The Research Model 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how companies can achieve supplier innovativeness 
through contracting. The study in this paper want to investigate some contract mechanisms’ 
effect on supplier innovativeness. The objective is to understand how companies can facilitate 
for innovative deliveries from their suppliers. The research model will represent the research 
problem, and show the selected variables and the expected relationship between them. The 
research model will form the foundation for the further study in this paper.  
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Figure 3: Research Model 
 
Figure 3 shows the anticipated relationship between the different variables. Supplier 
innovativeness is the dependent variable, and pay-for-performance, detailed contract, 
competition and close supplier relationships are the independent variables. We expect that pay-
for-performance will have a positive impact on supplier innovativeness, and want to study that 
relationship. The relationship between the variable detailed contract and supplier 
innovativeness is also expected to be positive. That is because we expect that a formal contract 
(a detailed contract) will have a complementary relationship with the variable of close supplier 
relationship. A close supplier relationship is anticipated to lead to supplier innovativeness, 
which is reflected by the research model above. The research model also shows the variable 
competition, which is expected to be a factor that may lead to supplier innovativeness. The 
variable competition and close supplier relationship are anticipated to have a substitute 
relationship. If you have a close relationship with your supplier, we expect it will be difficult 
to maintain a high level of competition.  
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The research model is mainly based on theory from (Domberger, 1998; Dyer et al., 1998; Goffre 
et al., 2005; Hüttinger, 2011; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Song & Di Benedetto, 2008; Sumo et al., 
2014; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). 
  
2.4.2 Presentation of Hypotheses 
Based on the research model and theory we have formulated six hypotheses to empirically test. 
These hypotheses form the research and study done in this paper, and are the basis for the 
discussion. The hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Pay-for-performance for the supplier will have a positive impact on supplier innovativeness 
H2: A detailed contract will lead to supplier innovativeness 
H3: Competition will lead to supplier innovativeness 
H4: A close supplier relationship will lead to supplier innovativeness 
H5: Competition and close supplier relationships are substitutes 
H6: Detailed contracts and close supplier relationships are complements 
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3. Methodology 
 
This section will describe the research design, the empirical setting, the method for data 
collection, and the measures used in our survey.  
 
3.1 Research Design  
In order to obtain the information needed from real life experiences we have to prepare a 
research scheme. The research scheme, or what we call a research design, has to be based on 
our research model(Halvorsen, 1989).  Halvorsen (1989) explains that to develop the research 
design from the research model we should look at each variable that we need to collect data on, 
and find the most suitable method for the research.  
A fundamental choice was to decide which research method we should use to collect the data 
needed. We can distinguish between two methods of research; qualitative and 
quantitative(Halvorsen, 1989). For the research in this paper we chose quantitative method in 
order to get data that is measurable. Quantitative research was the most suitable research 
method for this study. This is because the quantitative method makes us able to collect the data 
needed to test and analyze our hypotheses. The quantitative method is used when one begins 
with a theory including hypotheses, and tests to seek confirmation or disconfirmation of the 
hypotheses(Newman, 1998). We have chosen quantitative research method to be able to analyze 
correlations and to generalize our findings.  To conduct the quantitative research we developed 
an electronically questionnaire that was sent to a number of different companies. Using a 
questionnaire as the method for data collection opens the possibility of reaching many 
respondents, which is important to obtain data that can be generalized.  
 
3.2 Research Context 
To conduct the research we limited the population down to two major industries in Norway; 
The Oil and Gas industry and the Construction industry. The reason for narrowing down the 
population to consist of the two industries was because of our impression from the pre-phase 
studies of this paper. Our research problem is to analyze what factors lead to supplier 
innovation, and in order for companies to be able to provide useful answers we experienced 
that we needed respondents from medium to large scale companies. We also wanted to choose 
a population where the industry was characterized by high level of technology, where 
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innovation may be an important success factor. In the pre-phase studies of this paper we found 
that these factors are typical for the oil and gas industry and the construction industry in 
Norway. Both of these industries contain companies that are of large scale, and operates in 
markets where innovation is important. This is why we chose to investigate companies in the 
oil industry and the construction industry. 
To sum up, the population was defined with the following characteristics: 
- The company should have minimum 10 employees 
- The company should belong in the oil and gas industry or the construction industry in 
Norway 
- The respondent should be a Purchasing Manager, Supply Chain Manager, Purchaser or 
similar in the company asked 
In order to be able to generalize results from the research we needed to cover a substantial 
selection from the population. It is crucial for the quality of the study to choose the right 
selection amongst the population(Selnes, 1999). If we want to be able to generalize, the 
selection must be representative for the entire population. The objective is that the selection 
should describe the reality in the best way possible. We used a known website in Norway called 
Proff Forvalt (Proff-Forvalt, 2015) to retrieve lists with company information for our 
population.  
We got 92 responses from 46 companies, which gives us N=92. In the research we reached out 
to 120 random companies in the population chosen. The response rate was 38 %. This response 
rate compares favorably with existing research done by conducting questionnaires in business 
and management (Huang et al., 2014; Im & Rai, 2008; Koberg, Detienne, & Heppard, 2003). 
We believe this high response rate is related to our method of data collection. See section 3.3 
Data Collection.   
 
3.3 Data Collection 
A pre-test was constructed and carried out before the work of collecting data started. The pre-
test was sent to two people in the industry working with procurement. They are both familiar 
with the industry after working several years as purchasers. Both of them also have a good 
academic insight in the field of study, because they are working as lecturers in the University 
of Stavanger. The pre-test respondents are both working part time as lecturers in the course 
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Contract Signing and Review. The pre-test confirmed that the questionnaire was manageable 
and easy to understand for the respondents. After the confirmation from the pre-test we started 
the work of collecting data from the population. 
For the process of collecting the data needed for this study, we contacted 120 companies and 
asked if they could answer a questionnaire.  Each company was first contacted by telephone to 
ensure that the questionnaire was sent to the right person, preferably a Purchasing Manager. 
We believe that this step also helped with the response rate, because the survey was more 
targeted. All the people contacted got a personal e-mail with a link to the electronic 
questionnaire. Before they got the email, we had already spoken to several of the respondents 
personally on the phone. Our impression from this survey is that it is harder for people to ignore 
our email and our questionnaire, when they had been speaking to us personally in advance. The 
step of contacting the companies by telephone was a time consuming step, however we 
experienced that it had a positive effect on the response rate.  
The questionnaire consisted of 20 questions, were the respondents first had to assess a supplier 
that had shown great performance in relation to innovation, and then they had to answer the 20 
questions again for a supplier that had shown disappointing performance in relation to 
innovation. The questionnaire in total took the respondents about 5-10 minutes to answer. All 
of the questions in the questionnaire were in English. The reason we chose to have the 
questionnaire in English is because there are many of the purchasing managers in Norway that 
does not speak Norwegian. Another reason to have the questionnaire in English was because 
all the measures used were originally written in English. By translating the measures there 
would be a greater risk of interpreting the questions in a different way than their actual meaning, 
ending up with having measures that did not measure what they were intended to. The 
questionnaire was identical for all the asked companies. As previously mentioned, the 
respondents had to answer the questionnaire in two parts; first to think of a supplier whom they 
have a good experience with in terms of innovation, and then to answer the questionnaire again 
for a supplier they had a negative experience with in terms of innovation. In addition to the two 
parts, the questionnaire included 3 questions about basic company information. The result of 
the data collection was 92 responses to build the analysis on. The 92 responses was mainly 
collected from Purchasing Managers and some Purchasers. The respondent profile will be 
further elaborated in section 4.1.2 Respondent profile. The questions in the questionnaire had 
to be answered in a 7 point Likert scale and all the questions were set as mandatory to answer, 
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meaning that one were not able to submit the questionnaire without answering all questions. 
Since all the questions were mandatory to answer, we had no ‘missing data’ in the responses. 
 
3.4 Measures 
Based on construct definitions and research precedents we developed multi-item measures. We 
administrated the questionnaire using measures from theory. The measures for each variable 
will be presented in this section. The measures will also appear in Appendix A – Questionnaire.  
To construct measures we started with reviewing literature. When working with section 2. 
Theory we found several well-established studies that formed the basis for our measurement 
development. The measures used are developed based on previous research.  
The research model consists of 5 variables that need to be measured; supplier innovativeness, 
pay-for-performance, close supplier relationship, detailed contract and competition. In order to 
test our hypotheses we need reliable measures for each variable.  Based on our research problem 
the dependent variable is supplier’s innovativeness.  
We developed multi-item measures for the different variables. The items were taken from 
articles in similar field of study. In addition we also constructed 3 new items that were included 
in the questionnaire to further examine the variables.  The items were measured using a 7 point 
Likert scale.  
 
Supplier innovativeness (Hüttinger, 2011) 
The items used to measure the dependent variable, supplier innovativeness, was retrieved from 
(Hüttinger, 2011).  The article by Hüttinger et. al. (2011) was published in the International 
Journal of Innovation Management. The 4 supplier innovativeness measures are formulated to 
focus on collaborative innovation. Collaborative innovation is in contrast with innovation that 
is fully detached from the buyer supplier – relationship. The items therefore focus on the 
willingness to use technological capability on behalf of the buyer, willingness to share key 
technological information and the suppliers’ initiative to approach the buyer with frequent 
innovations. We used the items from Huttinger (2011) in their original form without making 
any changes. The article by Huttinger et al. (2011) is in the same field of study, and hence very 
suitable for this paper.   
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The items used for measuring the dependent variable Supplier innovativeness are as follows: 
Item 1: The level of technological capability the supplier possesses and is willing to use for 
our products is high 
Item 2: The supplier is willing to share key technological information 
Item 3: This supplier is capable of supporting collaborative processes in product development 
and process improvement 
Item 4: This supplier is frequently proactive in approaching us with innovations 
 
Pay-for-Performance (Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, & Krishnan, 1993; Sumo et al., 2014) 
To measure the variable Pay-for-Performance we used 3 items adapted from the article by 
Jaworski et al published in Journal of Marketing 1993.  The 3 items are identical to 3 of the 6 
items used by Sumo et al. (2014).  The items try to measure if the supplier’s rewards are linked 
to the outcome of the service delivered.  
The items used to measure the independent variable Pay-for-Performance are as follows: 
Item 5: The supplier's rewards are linked to the outcomes of the service delivered 
Item 6: We have agreed with our supplier upon performance bonuses on top of the regular 
payment schemes when performance levels exceeds targets 
Item 7: The supplier is financially awarded for developing alternative/new ways of achieving 
the performance targets 
 
Detailed contract (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005) 
The objective of measuring the variable detailed contract is to describe the level of detail used 
in the original contract regarding responsibilities, roles, how to handle unplanned events and 
the expected performance. The 4 items used to measure detailed contract were retrieved from 
Wuyts & Geyskens (2005). The article by Wuyts and Geyskens were published in Journal of 
Marketing in 2005. In addition to the 4 items retrieved from Wuyts & Geyskrens (2005) we 
also constructed a 5th item to measure the level of detailed specification included in the contract.  
The items used to measure the independent variable Detailed contract are as follows: 
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Item 14: In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely defines the role of each partner. 
Item 15: In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely defines the responsibilities of 
each partner. 
Item 16: In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely states how each party is to 
perform. 
Item 17: In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely states what will happen in the 
case of events occurring that were not planned. 
Item 19 (NEW): In dealing with this supplier, our contract includes a detailed specification of 
the scope of work to be delivered 
 
Competition (Eibe Sørensen, 2009) 
We retrieved 3 items from the article by Eibe Sørensen published in European Journal of 
Marketing in 2009. The items from Eibe Sørensen (2009) was used to measure the intensity of 
the competition in the suppliers’ industry and in the tender process. In addition we added 2 new 
items that we constructed to measure competition in the tender process.   
The items used to measure the independent variable Competition are as follows: 
Item 11: Competition in this supplier's industry is intense 
Item 12: Price competition is typical in this supplier's industry 
Item 13: Anything that this supplier can offer, competitors can match easily 
Item 18 (NEW): When a tenderer offer a different solution that stands out from the other 
received offers, it complicates our evaluation procedure of the bids 
Item 20 (NEW): We always have a competitive tendering process before awarding a contract 
to this supplier 
 
Close Supplier Relationship (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002) 
The items measuring close supplier relationship were retrieved from the article by Handfield 
and Bechtel published in the journal Industrial Marketing Management in 2002. The items were 
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used to measure how the purchaser would characterize the relationship with their supplier. The 
items has a focus on the suppliers’ investment in the buyer-supplier relationship. For example 
the items investigates if the supplier has dedicated equipment and reserved personnel to 
maintain the buyer-supplier relationship.  
The items used to measure the independent variable Close Supplier Relationship are as follows: 
Item 8: This supplier has dedicated equipment, reserved equipment and reserved capacity 
specifically to maintain our purchasing relationship 
Item 9: This supplier has dedicated personnel to maintain our purchasing relationship 
Item 10: This supplier has purchased specialized equipment to meet our need for this key-
input material 
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4. Results 
 
This section will present assessments of data quality and descriptive statistics for the dataset. It 
will also present the procedures used to verify the measurements of the variables. The objective 
of carrying out descriptive statistics is to gain better insight of the dataset. To analyze the data 
collected for our study, we chose to use the software program SPSS. SPSS is a common used 
software program for analyzing statistics and is a user friendly program. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
We use descriptive statistics to describe the basic features of the dataset. Descriptive statistics 
provide simple summaries about the dataset and the measures. The most common outputs in 
descriptive statistics are mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis(Bacon, 2013).  Descriptive 
statistics form the basis for our further quantitative analysis and will help with understanding 
and analyzing the results.  
 
4.1.1 Skewness and Kurtosis 
Skewness and kurtosis is a measure of the symmetry of a distribution(Hair, 2006). It quantifies 
how symmetrical the distribution is.  If a distribution is perfectly symmetrical, it has a skewness 
of zero. Multivariate data analysis require that all the variables are close to normally distributed. 
We have chosen a critical value of ±1.96 on skewness and kurtosis for the distribution. This 
corresponds with a significance level of 0,05.  It is one of the most common used critical 
values(Hair, 2006).  If the numbers from the dataset does not exceed this value, we can conclude 
with a 95% certainty that the variables are normally distributed. All items in our research have 
a skewness and kurtosis within the critical value of ±1.96. This means that further multivariate 
data analysis, like factor analysis and multiple regression, can be done based on normal 
distribution. From the descriptive statistics we can also see that the dataset has sufficient 
variation. Table 1 below shows the descriptive statistics for the different items.  
 
  
  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. Error 
Item1 92 1,00 7,00 4,9457 1,48520 -,748 ,251 -,337 ,498 
Item2 92 1,00 7,00 4,6196 1,53238 -,625 ,251 -,523 ,498 
Item3 92 1,00 7,00 4,6739 1,40727 -,558 ,251 -,619 ,498 
Item4 92 1,00 7,00 3,9674 1,66047 -,065 ,251 -,609 ,498 
Item5 92 1,00 7,00 3,7609 1,77510 -,098 ,251 -1,098 ,498 
Item6 92 1,00 7,00 2,4674 1,84838 1,088 ,251 -,121 ,498 
Item7 92 1,00 7,00 2,7500 1,78285 ,613 ,251 -,978 ,498 
Item8 92 1,00 7,00 4,0870 1,67498 -,355 ,251 -,924 ,498 
Item9 92 1,00 7,00 4,8804 1,66965 -,661 ,251 -,319 ,498 
Item10 92 1,00 7,00 3,8696 1,77416 -,172 ,251 -1,071 ,498 
Item11 92 1,00 7,00 5,3478 1,50044 -,697 ,251 -,272 ,498 
Item12 92 1,00 7,00 4,9457 1,73119 -,668 ,251 -,706 ,498 
Item13 92 1,00 7,00 4,5761 1,68532 -,332 ,251 -,893 ,498 
Item14 92 2,00 7,00 5,5217 1,31332 -,718 ,251 -,478 ,498 
Item15 92 2,00 7,00 5,5870 1,34370 -1,065 ,251 ,619 ,498 
Item16 92 2,00 7,00 5,4130 1,27660 -,692 ,251 -,426 ,498 
Item17 92 1,00 7,00 5,2717 1,43046 -,701 ,251 -,050 ,498 
Item18 92 1,00 7,00 4,6630 1,36902 -,442 ,251 -,256 ,498 
Item19 92 3,00 7,00 5,6957 1,29019 -,571 ,251 -,855 ,498 
Item20 92 1,00 7,00 5,4783 1,55823 -,983 ,251 ,178 ,498 
Valid N  92         
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
4.1.2 Respondent Profile 
The sample consist of 92 responses from companies within oil and gas and construction 
companies in Norway. The data was collected in the time period between the beginning of 
March until the end of April 2015.  
Part 1 in the questionnaire was used to get basic information about the respondents. The 
questionnaire was electronic and enabled the respondents to be anonymous, but demanded them 
to give away some basic data of their company; Company name, company size and position 
within company. The company name was only used to make sure that no double registrations 
of answers would occur. Figure 4 shows the number of employees in the companies responding. 
26% of the companies responding are in the category of 51-200 employees, and 24% are in the 
category of 501-1000 employees. Based on this data we can conclude that the respondents are 
mostly large companies. Only 6% of the respondents have under 50 employees. 
 
Figure 4 : Respondent Profile - Number of Employees in Company 
The job function for the employees’ for each company responding is divided into four groups; 
Purchasing managers, senior purchasers, purchasers, and employees in other management 
positions. We strived after having most of the answers from either purchasing managers or 
senior purchasers, because they would be the most qualified to answer the questionnaire. 22 of 
46 respondents were purchasing managers.  10 respondents were senior purchasers and 8 
respondents were purchasers. Only 6 respondents belonged to the category of other 
10-50
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201-500
13 %501-1000
24 %
1001-5000
20 %
5000+
11 %
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management positions. The respondents in other management positions were mainly from 
companies that did not have an employee dedicated to purchasing. Purchasers, senior 
purchasers, and purchasing managers were the most suitable for answering the questionnaire, 
because the questionnaire required insight in suppliers, contracts and supplier management. 
48% of the respondents are purchasing managers. This percentage indicates that the quality of 
the responses collected should be high because purchasing managers should be the most 
suitable to answer the questionnaire. It may lead to a more trustworthy dataset. The respondents 
in ‘other management positions’ were typical operations managers, project managers or 
business managers, which may also be employees that have enough insight and knowledge to 
give high quality responses. The allocation of the respondents’ job function is illustrated in 
Figure 5 below.  
 
Figure 5: Respondent Profile - Respondents Job Function within Company 
 
4.2 Variable Construction and Validation 
From the descriptive statistics we have concluded that we have a dataset that are close to 
normally distributed with sufficient variation. The next step is to construct valid and reliable 
variables for our further analysis. The purpose is to reduce the items to a smaller set of variables 
that are suitable for testing our hypotheses. We want to identify the interrelationships between 
the items and we do this by conducting a factor analysis. The items used in the survey are 
adapted from previous research and theory, therefore we have an intuition of how the items 
should group.  We used SPSS to do a factor analysis as the first step to construct the variables.  
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The first step in the factor analysis is testing communalities. Table 2 below shows the 
communalities before and after extraction. The communalities in the column to the right 
reflect the common value in the data structure (Hair, 2006). The communalities should assess 
whether the variables meet acceptable levels of explanation. As common for many studies we 
have chosen that about one half of the variance of each variable should be taken into account 
(Hair, 2006). More specifically we have chosen that 0.45 should be the guideline, which 
means that variables with communalities below 0.45 does not have sufficient explanation 
(Hair, 2006). As we can see from table 2 all items are within the defined cut-off limit.  
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Item1 1,000 ,755 
Item2 1,000 ,729 
Item3 1,000 ,766 
Item4 1,000 ,637 
Item5 1,000 ,496 
Item6 1,000 ,834 
Item7 1,000 ,799 
Item8 1,000 ,746 
Item9 1,000 ,767 
Item10 1,000 ,778 
Item11 1,000 ,691 
Item12 1,000 ,736 
Item14 1,000 ,834 
Item15 1,000 ,859 
Item16 1,000 ,789 
Item17 1,000 ,507 
Item19 1,000 ,462 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table 2: Communalities 
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The next step in the factor analysis is to analyze the Rotated Component Matrix. In Table 3 
shown below is the rotated component matrix. We used this Principal Component with Varimax 
rotation. Item 13, 18, and 20 did not match with any other items, and were therefore deleted for 
further analysis.  
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
Item1 ,237 ,821 ,142 -,044 -,045 
Item2 ,398 ,721 ,097 ,178 ,100 
Item3 ,086 ,839 ,231 ,011 -,032 
Item4 ,037 ,744 ,183 ,212 -,062 
Item5 ,159 -,277 ,230 ,578 -,083 
Item6 -,058 ,253 ,071 ,855 ,172 
Item7 -,003 ,202 ,003 ,866 -,089 
Item8 ,308 ,221 ,741 ,192 -,129 
Item9 ,094 ,200 ,833 -,126 ,098 
Item10 ,109 ,201 ,807 ,273 -,017 
Item11 ,229 -,027 -,035 ,029 ,797 
Item12 -,051 -,040 ,020 -,020 ,855 
Item14 ,886 ,173 ,123 ,057 -,019 
Item15 ,905 ,161 ,110 -,027 ,012 
Item16 ,873 ,018 ,148 -,016 ,067 
Item17 ,647 ,126 ,141 ,228 -,009 
Item19 ,583 ,163 ,006 -,145 ,274 
Extraction method: Principal component analysis. 
Rotationmethod: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations 
 
Table 3: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
After the factor analysis we ran a reliability test with a calculation of Cronbach’s Alpha for 
each variable that we constructed. Based on methodology from Hair (2006) we aimed to have 
variables with an alpha of 0.6 or higher(Hair, 2006). The higher the Cronbach Alpha the more 
desirable the variable is. The Cronbach’s Alpha for each constructed variable is shown below. 
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Variable 1 – Supplier Innovativeness 
This variable consists of item 1-4 and has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.853 which is well above 
our cut-off limit. The high Cronbach Alpha makes this variable a good variable. The item 
statistics for each item grouped in the variable, Supplier Innovativeness is shown in Table 5 
below. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,853 4 
Table 4: Reliability Statistics for Supplier Innovativeness 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item1 4,9457 1,48520 92 
Item2 4,6196 1,53238 92 
Item3 4,6739 1,40727 92 
Item4 3,9674 1,66047 92 
Table 5: Item Statistics for Supplier Innovativeness 
 
Variable 2 – Pay-for-Performance 
This variable consists of item 5-7 and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.701 which is well above 
our cut-off limit. The high Cronbach Alpha makes this variable a good variable. The item 
statistics for each item grouped in the variable, Pay-for-Perfromance is shown in Table 7 
below. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,701 3 
Table 6: Reliability Statistics for Pay-for-Performance 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item5 3,7609 1,77510 92 
Item6 2,4674 1,84838 92 
Item7 2,7500 1,78285 92 
Table 7: Item Statistics for Pay-for-performance 
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Variable 3 – Close Supplier Relationships 
This variable consists of item 8-10 and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.810 which is well above 
our cut-off limit. The high Cronbach Alpha makes this variable a good variable. The item 
statistics for each item grouped in the variable, Close Supplier Relationship is shown in Table 
9 below. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,810 3 
Table 8: Reliability Statistics for Close Supplier Relationship 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item8 4,0870 1,67498 92 
Item9 4,8804 1,66965 92 
Item10 3,8696 1,77416 92 
Table 9: Item Statistics for Close Supplier Relationship 
 
Variable 4 – Competition 
This variable consists of item 11 and item 12, and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.593. We chose 
to round 0.593 up to 0.6 in order to be able to use the variable in further analysis. With a 
Cronbach Alpha of 0.6 this is an acceptable variable. The item statistics for each item grouped 
in the variable, Competition is shown in Table 11 below. 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,593 2 
Table 10: Reliability Statistics for Competition 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item11 5,3478 1,50044 92 
Item12 4,9457 1,73119 92 
Table 11: Item Statistics for Competition 
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Variable 5 – Detailed Contract 
This variable consists of item 14-17 and item 19 and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.863 which is 
well above our cut-off limit. The high Cronbach Alpha makes this variable a good variable. 
The item statistics for each item grouped in the variable, Detailed Contract is shown in Table 
13 below. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
,863 5 
Table 12: Reliability Statistics for Detailed Contract 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item14 5,5217 1,31332 92 
Item15 5,5870 1,34370 92 
Item16 5,4130 1,27660 92 
Item17 5,2717 1,43046 92 
Item19 5,6957 1,29019 92 
Table 13: Item Statistics for Detailed Contract 
 
The result for the Cronbach Alpha test was sufficient for further analysis. The variable of 
competition was borderline to the cut-off limit of 0.6, but in order to keep the variable in the 
analysis we chose to emphasize the values from the Rotated Component Matrix. Based on the 
Communality and factor loadings and the Cronbach Alpha test we can conclude that the items 
grouped together naturally relates to each other.  
Descriptive Statistics for the Constructed Factors 
Table 14 below shows the descriptive statistic for the constructed factors that will be tested in 
the multiple regression analysis.  
The next analyze done is a new descriptive statistics analyze done for each new variable. Shown 
in Table 14 we can see the descriptive statistics for Supplier Innovativeness, Pay-for-
Performance, Close Suppler Relationship, Competition and Detailed Contract. All the variables 
have a skewness and kurtosis within the critical value of ±1.96. This means that further 
multivariate data analysis can be done based on normal distribution. From the descriptive 
statistics we can also see that the dataset has sufficient variation. 
  
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Supplier_innovativeness 92 1,00 7,00 4,5516 1,26911 -,612 ,251 -,357 ,498 
Pay_for_performance 92 1,00 6,67 2,9928 1,42623 ,634 ,251 -,293 ,498 
Close_supplier_relationship 92 1,00 7,00 4,2790 1,45278 -,437 ,251 -,599 ,498 
Competition 92 2,00 7,00 5,1467 1,36587 -,306 ,251 -,802 ,498 
Detailed_contract 92 3,00 7,00 5,4978 1,07007 -,492 ,251 -,519 ,498 
Valid N (listwise) 92         
          
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for the Constructed Variables
  
Before moving on to regression analysis, the correlation between the variables has to be 
checked. Analysis of correlations is a method to reveal relationships between the different 
variables. The correlation matrix is a table showing the interrelationships among the 
variables(Hair, 2006). The correlation matrix is shown in Table 15 below. From the correlation 
matrix we see that there are no correlations that are disturbing for our analysis. Disturbingly 
high correlations have a value between 0.6-0.7 and higher(Hair, 2006). High correlation 
between variables may indicate that some of the factors measure the same. Since we do not see 
any high correlation between our variables it indicates that our factors do not overlap.  
 
Correlations  
 Supplier_ 
innovativeness 
Pay_for_ 
performance 
Close_ 
supplier_ 
relationship 
Competition Detailed_ 
contract 
Supplier_innovativeness 1     
Pay_for_performance ,222* 1    
Close_supplier_relationship ,455** ,270** 1   
Competition -,019 -,006 -,022 1  
Detailed_contract ,387** ,095 ,357** ,152 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 15: Correlations
  
4.3 Hypotheses testing 
In section 2.4.2 Presentation of Hypotheses six correlation hypotheses were presented. Four 
hypotheses were concerning how different contract factors impact suppliers’ innovativeness, 
and two hypotheses were concerning the relationship between the contract factors. This section 
will present the findings in our study with testing each of the hypotheses in turn. First this 
section will start with showing the testing procedures and then present the result of the 
hypotheses testing. 
 
4.3.1 Testing Procedure 
Regression analysis were used to test the six correlation hypotheses. We anticipate a linear 
function, since we do not see reason for there being complex functional relationships. There are 
many alternative methods for testing the hypotheses, but regression analysis is suitable because 
we want to see the direction, strength, and the relative importance of the variables. Regression 
analysis is a versatile dependence technique, and is therefore the most common used analysis 
method. Multiple regression is a regression model with two or more independent variables(Hair, 
2006).  Multiple regression analysis is a general statistical method that is used to analyze the 
relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent variable(Hair, 2006). 
The study done in this paper includes a dependent variable and several independent variables, 
which means that a multiple regression method may be suitable for doing the analysis. To test 
hypotheses 1-4 a multiple regression analysis were used, with supplier innovativeness as the 
dependent variable. To test hypotheses 5 and 6 another multiple regression analysis were 
constructed, were the dependent variable was close supplier relationship.  
 
4.3.2 Results of Hypothesis Testing 
The study consists of six hypotheses. This section will present the results from the two multiple 
regression analysis constructed and show the results for each of the six hypotheses tested. The 
standardized coefficients, the beta, shows the change in the dependent measure for each unit 
change in the independent variable(Hair, 2006). Hair et al (2006) explains that “comparison 
between regression coefficients allows for a relative assessment of each variable’s importance 
in the regression model”. This means that we can compare the beta for each variable shown in 
the tables below, and see which variable has the most impact in the analysis. It gives the ability 
to see the relative importance of the variables, and compare the importance of the variables with 
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each other. Below is the results from the testing of hypotheses 1-4 shown first, and the results 
from the testing of hypotheses 5 and 6 shown at the end of this section. 
 
Results from Multiple Regression Analysis 1 - Hypotheses 1-4 
In Table 16 below the R-squared for the multiple regression analysis 1 is shown. R-squared is 
the “percent of variance explained” by the model.  This means that R-squared is the fraction by 
which the variance of the errors is less than the variance of the dependent variable(Hair, 2006). 
The R-squared for Regression Analysis 1 in this paper is 0.278. 
 
Table 16: R Squared for Multiple Regression Analysis 1 
 
Table 17 shows the coefficients for the hypotheses. Pay_for_performance refers to hypothesis 
1, Detailed_contract refers to hypothesis 2, Competition refers to hypothesis 3, and 
Close_supplier_relationship refers to hypothesis 4.  
 
Hypothesis 1 – Pay-for-Performance 
H1: Pay-for-performance for the supplier will have a positive impact on supplier innovativeness 
As we can see from Table 17, hypothesis 1 is not statistically significant on either 1%, 5 %, or 
10 % significance level (t=1,202). Hypothesis 1 is therefore not supported. The result does not 
show any statistically significant effect of pay-for-performance on supplier innovativeness.  
 
Hypothesis 2 – Close Supplier Relationship 
H2: A detailed contract will lead to supplier innovativeness 
Hypothesis 2 is statistically significant even on 1% significance level (t=3,183). Hypotheses 2 
is therefore supported. The result show a statistically significant effect of close supplier 
Model Summary Change Statistics    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 ,527a ,278 ,244 1,10321 ,278 8,356 4 87 ,000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Detailed_contract, Pay_for_performance, Competition, Close_supplier_relationship 
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relationship on supplier innovativeness. The standardized coefficient (Beta) for hypotheses 2 
has a value of 0,325 which is the highest beta value in this analysis. It means that close supplier 
relationship has the highest importance in the regression model.  
 
Hypothesis 3 – Competition 
H3: Competition will lead to supplier innovativeness 
Hypothesis 3 is not statistically significant on either 1%, 5 %, or 10 % significance level (t=-
0,947). Hypothesis 3 is therefore not supported. The result does not show any statistically 
significant effect of competition on supplier innovativeness.  
 
Hypothesis 4 – Detailed Contract 
H4: A close supplier relationship will lead to supplier innovativeness 
Hypothesis 4 is statistically significant even on 1% significance level (t=2,712). Hypothesis 4 
is therefore supported. The result show that detailed contracting has a statistically significant 
effect on supplier innovativeness.  
  
 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa        
   Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model  B  Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 1,545  ,736  2,101 ,039 
 Pay_for_performance ,096  ,084 ,107 1,135 ,260 
 Close_supplier_relationship ,287  ,088 ,329 3,252 ,002 
 Competition -,048  ,086 -,052 -,564 ,574 
 Detailed_contract ,316  ,117 ,267 2,694 ,008 
 a. Dependent Variable: Supplier_innovativeness 
Table 17: Multiple Regression Analysis 1 - Hypotheses 1-4
  Page 50 of 84 
 
Results from Multiple Regression Analysis 2 – Hypotheses 5 and 6 
 
The R squared for multiple regression analysis 2 is 0.277. This is shown in Table 18 below. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,526a ,277 ,244 1,26347 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Detailed_contract, Pay_for_performance, Competition, Supplier_innovativeness 
Table 18: R Squared for Multiple Regression Analysis 2 
 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 
H5: Competition and close supplier relationships are substitutes 
H6: Detailed contracts and close supplier relationships are complements 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 were concerning the relationship between close supplier relationship and 
the variables competition and detailed contracts. Multiple regression analysis were used to 
test the relationships between these variables. Close supplier relationship was defined as the 
dependent variable. Table 18 below shows that there is a statistically significant relationship 
on a 5% significance level between detailed contracting and close supplier relationships (t 
value= 2,198).  The results in table 18 do not show a statistical significant between 
competition and close supplier relationships. Hypothesis 5 expected a negative relationship 
between the two variables, which is confirmed by the results, but not on a statistical 
significant level. It means that we cannot draw a conclusion about the relationship between 
competition and close supplier relationships. Hypotheses 5 is therefore not supported. 
 
 
Coefficientsa       
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model  B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 1,949 ,866  2,250 ,027 
 Competition -,083 ,106 -,078 -,779 ,438 
 Detailed_contract ,501 ,136 ,369 3,698 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: Close_supplier_relationship 
Table 19: Multiple Regression Analysis 2 – Hypotheses 5 and 6 
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4.3.3 Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
 
The results from the study are summarized in Table 21 below: 
Hypothesis Results  
 
H1 
 
Pay-for-performance for the supplier will have a positive impact on supplier 
innovativeness 
 
Not supported 
 
H2 
 
A detailed contract will lead to supplier innovativeness 
 
Supported 
 
H3 
 
Competition will lead to supplier innovativeness 
 
Not supported 
 
H4 
 
A close supplier relationship will lead to supplier innovativeness 
 
Supported 
 
H5 
 
Competition and close supplier relationships are substitutes 
 
Not supported 
 
H6 
 
 
Detailed contracts and close supplier relationships are complements 
 
Supported 
Table 20: Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
 
3 out of 6 hypotheses were supported, and the implications of the findings will be analyzed and 
discussed in section 5. Discussion and Conclusion of this paper.   
 
4.3.4 Adjusted Research Model 
The findings from the study are illustrated in Figure 6 which shows the adjusted research 
model. The adjusted research model illustrates the relationships found between the variables 
pay-for-performance, detailed contracting, competition and close supplier relationships in 
relation to supplier innovativeness. It also shows the relationship between the variables detailed 
contract and competition in relation to close supplier relationship. The relationships that was 
not supported by the results from the study are illustrated with dotted arrows and lines. Where 
the lines are ‘normal’, the results from the study underpinned the original research model. The 
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value of the beta coefficients are presented in parentheses. The statistically significant effects 
are marked with ** for 5% significance level.   
 
Figure 6: Adjusted Research Model 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This section will cover the implications of the findings for theory and practice. We will discuss 
and analyze the results presented in Section 4. Based on the results we will try to draw 
conclusions and raise managerial implications from the findings. The discussion of the results 
for each hypotheses will be divided in their own sections, before drawing a general conclusion. 
This section will further look into limitations for the findings and future research opportunities.  
 
5.1 Hypothesis 1 – Pay-for-Performance and Supplier Innovativeness 
Hypothesis 1 stated that pay-for-performance for the supplier will have a positive impact on 
supplier innovativeness, meaning that a performance based contract should lead to the supplier 
being more innovative. This hypothesis was not supported in our study. We found no 
significant effect showing that if suppliers are paid in relation to their performance it will lead 
to more innovation. This is a finding that is contradictory to the findings from the article by 
Sumo et.al (2014), where they found a correlation between pay-for-performance and both 
radical and incremental innovation. An earlier article by Sumo et. al (2012) suggested that pay-
for-performance in relation to innovation were a relatively unexplored field of study which 
required more research. Sumo et. al did research this relationship in the article published in 
2014, but the field of study is still relatively unexplored. It is interesting that our findings 
contradict the study by Sumo et. al (2014).  Our findings underpin the suggestion by Sumo et. 
al (2012) that performance based contracts, pay-for-performance and innovation should be 
further researched in order to achieve generic results. This leads to the theoretical implication 
from our finding, that one should further research the relationship between performance based 
contracts and supplier innovativeness. The subject needs more research before one can make 
statements whether bonuses for the supplier based on performance will lead to the supplier 
being more innovative or not. Other theory studied have also stated that companies should 
construct their contracts in order to maximize the incentives for the supplier to be 
innovative(Domberger, 1998). The findings from our study suggests that performance and 
reward schemes in the contract may actually not promote the supplier to be more innovative. 
The findings may indicate that instead of putting much effort into reward schemes for their 
suppliers, the companies should focus on other areas of supplier management when they want 
to achieve innovative deliveries. Companies should understand that constructing incentives 
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based on pay-for-performance may actually not promote the supplier innovativeness as one 
might think. However, as already stated this subject should be further researched.  
 
5.2 Hypothesis 2 – Detailed Contracts and Supplier Innovativeness 
Hypothesis 2 anticipated a positive relationship between formal contracts and supplier 
innovativeness. More specifically hypothesis 2 stated that a detailed contract will lead to 
supplier innovativeness. The results from the study supported the hypothesis. The findings 
show a statistically significant positive effect of detailed contracting on suppliers’ 
innovativeness. These results relates to other theory studying this relationship. A detailed 
contract forms the foundation for a good and stable relationship with the supplier. A contract 
is used to avoid uncertainty, and studies show that companies that are more tolerant of power 
distance in the supply chain show a greater propensity to write detailed contracts(Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005). Poppo and Zenger (2002) found in their study a complementary relationship 
between formal contracts and relational governance. Our results supports their findings and 
also indicates that a formal contract may form the basis for a healthy supplier relationship, 
which will contribute to innovation. Establishing a formal contract may require negotiations 
where the buyer and supplier meet. Meetings and contract follow-up can promote a closer 
relationship between the two parties. Our study shows that a detailed contract can increase the 
probability of achieving innovative deliveries from suppliers. The managerial implication from 
this is that companies should establish formal contracts with their suppliers for key-deliveries. 
A detailed contract can promote supplier innovativeness, and form the foundation for a healthy 
supplier relationship. A formal contract is good for the supplier relationship and innovation, 
but perhaps only up to a certain point. If the contract has a very detailed specification it will 
give the suppliers little room for new ideas and alternative solutions. The findings from our 
study shows that a detailed contract is good for supplier innovativeness, but we did not research 
if this effect has a turning point where the contract is far too detailed.  Purchasers and contract 
engineers should try to keep a balance, and complex deliveries require a more detailed contract 
specification. A detailed contract can be a tool for achieving innovative deliveries from 
suppliers, and companies should therefore establish formal contracts with their key-suppliers 
in their procurement practice.  
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5.3 Hypothesis 3 – Competition and Supplier Innovativeness 
The expectation for hypothesis 3 was that a high level of competition would foster innovation. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that competition should lead to suppliers being more innovative. 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. The results from the study did not show any statistically 
significant relationship between the level of competition and suppliers’ innovativeness. This 
means that the study did not find that competition will lead to suppliers being more innovative. 
The study looked at competition in the suppliers’ industry and could not find a significant 
effect. The basis for this hypothesis was theory stating that competition fosters 
innovation(Domberger, 1998).  This is a statement that we still believe could be correct, but in 
a buyer-supplier relationship we could not find this effect to be significant. In general it might 
be correct that a competitive environment enhances the chance for innovation. This is because 
when there is an environment characterized by competition, it may force companies to think 
‘outside the box’ and come up with new solutions to differentiate from their competitors. 
However, as already stated, the findings did not show this effect of competition on supplier 
innovativeness.  The subject should be further studied in order to be able to draw any 
conclusions.  
Competition and close supplier relationships are two variables that we expected to be in 
conflict. The reasoning was that it will be hard for companies to maintain both a high level of 
competition simultaneously as maintaining a close supplier relationship. Therefore we did not 
believe there could be a significant positive effect on innovation for both of these factors on 
innovation. Close supplier relationship will be discussed in the next section, but we can reveal 
that there was found a positive effect of having a close relationship with the supplier on 
suppliers’ innovativeness.  The relationship between competition and close supplier 
relationship was also tested, and will be further discussed in Section 5.5 Hypothesis 5. There 
was no significant effects found in the relationship between the two variables. 
 
5.4 Hypothesis 4 – Close Supplier Relationships and Supplier 
Innovativeness 
Hypothesis 4 anticipated that having a close relationship with your supplier would lead to the 
supplier being more innovative. Hypothesis 4 was highly supported. The results showed a 
strong connection between a close supplier relationship and supplier innovativeness. The 
results showed a significant effect even on a 1% significance level. The findings shows that it 
is very important for managers to focus on having a close relationship with suppliers for key-
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deliveries. When the relationship between buyer and supplier is close, it leads to the supplier 
being more involved. The supplier may then be more involved in early phases of new product 
development which is known to lead to innovative deliveries(Goffre et al., 2005). A close 
supplier relationship will also lead to the supplier having a better understanding of the needs 
of the buyer. A close relationship then makes the supplier able to offer new technology that fits 
the needs of the buyer. The deliveries from a close supplier may be more suitable and targeted 
for the needs of the buyer. The results from our study shows that a close supplier relationship 
is what makes the greatest impact on supplier innovativeness.  The transfer of knowledge is 
better between buyers and suppliers that have a close relationship(Domberger, 1998). In a close 
supplier relationship it might be likely that the company has a somewhat preferred customer 
status with their supplier. If the company is a ‘preferred customer’ it is more likely that the 
suppliers will pay both more attention and loyalty towards the company(Hüttinger, 2011). As 
already stated, a close relationship with your supplier will lead to a greater exchange of 
knowledge, which again may provide a basis for inter-organizational innovative 
capabilities(Hüttinger, 2011).  A close supplier relationship was found as the main factor to 
promote supplier innovativeness in our study. Companies should therefore allocate resources 
to maintaining a close and healthy relationship with their suppliers for important deliveries. A 
close supplier relationship can lead to the supplier giving the company more innovative 
solutions. 
 
5.5 Hypothesis 5 – Competition and Close Supplier Relationships 
As previously mentioned, hypothesis 5 expected that the variable competition and the variable 
close supplier relationship were substitutes for each other. Hypothesis 5 anticipated that having 
a close supplier relationship would be hard to maintain while also maintaining high levels of 
competition. This hypothesis was the only hypothesis that were solely based on practical 
observations, and not theory. The results showed no statistically significant effect of a 
substitute relationship between the two variables of competition and close supplier relationship, 
and the hypothesis was therefore not supported. The findings indicate that having high levels 
of competition will not be a stopper for having a close relationship with your supplier. From 
the findings we can conclude that companies can have a competitive tender process as well as 
maintaining a close supplier relationship, which means that it may not reduce the probability 
of achieving innovative deliveries. It may be worth to mention again that we did not find any 
positive effect of competition on supplier innovativeness, but it does not mean that competition 
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reduces supplier innovativeness. Having a competitive tendering process is normal procedure 
in many companies, and it is good for managers to know that competition is not a variable in 
conflict with a close supplier relationship. Competition was not found to promote supplier 
innovativeness, but since it is not in conflict with having close supplier relationships, it means 
that it is not hurtful for the process of achieving innovation. 
 
5.6 Hypothesis 6 – Detailed contracts and Close Supplier Relationships 
Hypothesis 6 anticipated that detailed contracts and close supplier relationship were 
complements. By being complements it means that having a formal contract may promote a 
close relationship. The findings in this paper shows a significant positive effect on the 
relationship between close supplier relationship and detailed contracting. The finding supports 
the already detected complementary relationship between formal contracts and relational 
governance found by Poppo and Zenger (2002) in their study. The same result is also found in 
other theory. Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) found a positive significant effect between detailed 
contract and close supplier relationship. This relationship is supported by several studies which 
indicated that having a close relationship with your supplier and having a detailed contract in 
place is crucial for success.   
Having a formal contract may form the basis for developing a close and healthy supplier 
relationship. A detailed contract sets the guidelines and the expectations between the two 
parties. Having a detailed formal contract may require work from both parties in negotiations. 
The parties often have to meet in these contract negotiations which mean that it may create a 
bound between the two parties already in that phase of the procurement stage. It is our casual 
observation that most companies have a formal contract established for the suppliers they use 
often. Having a formal contract means that the terms & conditions of the procurement should 
be agreed upon, which may make it easier to continue purchasing products or services from 
that same supplier. Therefore it seems natural that formal contracts and close supplier 
relationships are complementary, which is supported by the results in this study.  
 
5.7 Theoretical and Managerial Implications 
Theoretical implications from this study are among other that performance based contracts and 
competition need to be further examined before one can conclude on their relation with 
innovation. The findings in this paper on performance based contracts are contradictory to other 
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studies. We found no effect of a pay-for-performance scheme on supplier innovativeness. This 
is contradictory to other studies, which implicates that it is a field of study that needs further 
examination. Performance based contracts and supplier innovativeness should be further 
researched before one can draw generic conclusions on the subject. Theoretical, practical and 
casual observations on competition expected competition to foster supplier innovativeness. 
However, the results from this paper did not show any statistical effect of competition on 
innovation. We suggest that the relationship between competition and innovation also should 
be further researched.  
The main managerial implication from this paper is that companies need to focus and put effort 
into the relationship with their supplier. Our study found that having a close and healthy 
relationship with your suppliers will increase the chance of achieving innovative deliveries. 
Managers need to put resources into maintaining a close relationship with their suppliers. 
Especially suppliers for critical and key-deliveries. Companies should strive for achieving a 
preferred customer status, which will increase the chance of the supplier being more innovative. 
This is because a close relationship with your suppliers will make the suppliers more loyal and 
they will put more effort into your company.  
Establishing formal contracts with suppliers will help sustaining ties between company and 
supplier. The findings from this study shows that a detailed contract can be a tool for achieving 
supplier innovativeness. It means that managers should establish the process of having detailed 
formal contracts with their key-suppliers. A formal contract and a close supplier relationship 
may also make the contracting of services more seamless. For complex deliveries it is 
especially important to have a detailed contract. Another finding from our research was that 
detailed contracts and close supplier relationships function as complements. It means that 
managers do not have to be afraid that detailed contracts can hurt the supplier relationship, 
because the effect is actually opposite. A detailed contract can strengthen the supplier 
relationship, and both detailed contracts and close supplier relationships can contribute to 
suppliers’ innovativeness.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The overall aim has been to examine how companies can facilitate for innovative deliveries 
from their suppliers. The main purpose has been to look at how contract mechanisms can 
promote supplier innovativeness. Based on the study conducted in this paper, having a close 
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supplier relationship stands out as a very important factor for achieving supplier 
innovativeness. In a close relationship with a supplier, the information exchange and the 
knowledge exchange is greater than in a poor supplier relationship. When you have a good 
information exchange it increases the possibility of achieving innovation. A reason for that can 
be because the supplier better understand the needs of their buyer. Close supplier relationships 
will contribute to a more seamless production. Studies have shown that an early supplier 
integration in new product development can foster innovation. Early supplier integration is 
more likely to happen in a close supplier relationship. A close supplier relationship can lead to 
the suppliers paying more attention and loyalty towards the company.  
Our findings show that having a detailed formal contract also points out as a factor for 
facilitating for supplier innovativeness. A detailed contract was found to be complementary to 
a close supplier relationship, which means that one does not exclude the other. Companies can 
have a close relationship with their supplier and also have a detailed and formal contract in 
place. The work of establishing a formal contract, requires the parties to come together in 
negotiations. This work may be a time consuming process, and the parties will automatically 
develop a relationship. Having a detailed contract will reduce uncertainty in a buyer-supplier 
relationship, and may contribute to a more healthy relationship between the buyers and 
suppliers. This is because a contract may be very useful in situations when disagreements 
occur.  A contract may also state that the company should be the preferred customer for the 
supplier, which will lead the suppliers to having to prioritize the company in some situations. 
A preferred customer status can lead to the supplier being more focused and loyal towards the 
company, which again can lead to innovative deliveries. A formal contract forms the 
foundation for the supplier relationship, and the results from our study show that a detailed 
contract can contribute to supplier innovativeness.  
The study in this paper tried to find a relationship between competition and supplier 
innovativeness, but did not succeed. There was no significant effect that competition would 
enhance the chance of suppliers being innovative. It indicates that a close supplier relationship 
is more important for facilitating for supplier innovativeness. The findings in this study clearly 
points at close supplier relationship to be the important factor for achieving innovation. Pay-
for-performance or performance based contracts were believed to foster innovation, however 
the study did not find any significant effect. Therefore performance based contracts are not 
shown to promote innovation, but it does not mean that it will do the opposite. It seems like the 
incentives made in a contract cannot outdo the importance of a close relationship with the 
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supplier. Companies should allocate resources and focus on having close relationships and 
detailed contracts with their key suppliers.  
 
5.9 Limitations 
The results in our paper must be interpreted in view of certain limitations. In this section we 
will discuss the limitations in this paper. The study of this paper is an investigation of how 
companies can facilitate for innovative deliveries from their suppliers.  
There are several limitations in the paper. When we conducted the survey we only asked two 
industries located in Norway; the oil and gas industry and the construction industry. For the 
survey to be more complete and the results more suitable for generalizing, more industries 
could have been included. Perhaps we should also have included companies outside Norway 
in order to have a broader population. However, having a defined population where the 
respondents cover a large part, makes a higher internal validity of the findings. This means that 
we can be more certain of the conclusions drawn for the chosen population; the internal validity 
is high. This is because in order to get findings that are applicable for the entire population, one 
should cover as much of the population as possible.  
Another limitation of this paper is time. Because of the time limit we could not choose a larger 
population to study, because then we would not be able to get a dataset that would cover enough 
of the population. Because of the time limit we also did not have the time to ask all the 
companies that we intended to ask to participate in our survey. This resulted in having less 
respondents than what we could have achieved with having a larger timeframe.   
The questionnaire was written and sent out to the respondents in English, which may have been 
another limitation. A lot of companies in Norway are using English as their working language, 
but not all the companies and all employees. We experienced two companies that had 
difficulties with the questionnaire being in English, and therefore did not want to respond. 
These two companies chose to give us feedback on it. There might be other companies as well 
that did not want to answer the questionnaire, because it was written in English. 
In our questionnaire we mostly applied measures from different theory. The items where 
adapted from (Eibe Sørensen, 2009; Hüttinger, 2011; Sumo et al., 2014; Wuyts & Geyskens, 
2005). Adapting the items from different theory is strengthening the reliability of the study. 
The reliability is supported by the Cronbach alpha test. However, the measures for the variable 
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competition may have been taken out of context. This could have made the measure of 
competition irrelevant, which might be why there was no statistically significant effect in the 
hypotheses where competition was a variable (Hypothesis 3 and 5). 
 
5.10 Future Research 
For future research it would be interesting to further investigate the variable of competition. A 
suggestion would be to look into competition specifically in the tendering process. Because the 
findings from this study could not find that competition in general foster innovation, it would 
be interesting to see if competition in the tender process may foster supplier innovativeness. 
The items used for measuring competition may have been a limitation of this paper, and 
therefore it would be interesting if others had investigated the subject further.   
Another suggestion for future research is to do more research on pay-for-performance. Our 
hypothesis for pay-for-performance was not supported, and is a finding that is contradictory to 
the findings from the article by Sumo et.al (2014). They found a correlation between pay-for-
performance and innovation. Pay-for-Performance and innovation is a relatively unexplored 
field of study which required more research. We suggest that one should further study the 
relationship between performance based contracts and supplier innovativeness in order to draw 
conclusions.  
Detailed contracts is another field of study that would be interesting to further examine. The 
findings from this paper showed that detailed contracts correlates positively with supplier 
innovativeness and close supplier relationships. Having a detailed or formal contract seems to 
foster innovation. For future research we suggest investigating if there may be a point where 
this trend turns. It would be interesting to look into what would happen if the contract is far too 
detailed. Will the contract still foster supplier innovativeness or will the detailed specifications 
prevent new innovations? For future research we suggest investigating where and if there is a 
point where a detailed contract is far too detailed, that it may be a stopper for supplier 
innovativeness.  
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Appendix A - Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire  
Please fill in your basic company information before answering the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire has 2 parts consisting of 20 questions each. 
 
Your job title*: 
 
 
Company name*: 
 
 
 
Number of employees*: 
 10-50 
 51-200 
 201-500 
 501-1000 
 1001-5000 
 5000+ 
 
PART 1  
Think of one particular supplier that has shown excellent performance in product and process 
innovation when answering this section of the questionnaire. 
1. The level of technological capability the supplier possesses and is willing to use for 
our products is high* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
2. The supplier is willing to share key technological information* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
3. This supplier is capable of supporting collaborative processes in product development 
and process improvement* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
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4. This supplier is frequently proactive in approaching us with innovations* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
5. The supplier's rewards are linked to the outcomes of the service delivered* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
6. We have agreed with our supplier upon performance bonuses on top of the regular 
payment schemes when performance levels exceeds targets* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
7. The supplier is financially awarded for developing alternative/new ways of achieving 
the performance targets* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
8. This supplier has dedicated equipment, reserved equipment and reserved capacity 
specifically to maintain our purchasing relationship* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
9. This supplier has dedicated personnel to maintain our purchasing relationship* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
10. This supplier has purchased specialized equipment to meet our need for this key-input 
material* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
11. Competition in this supplier's industry is intense* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
12. Price competition is typical in this supplier's industry* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
  Page 68 of 84 
 
13. Anything that this supplier can offer, competitors can match easily* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
14. In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely defines the role of each partner* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
15. In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely defines the responsibilities of each 
partner* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
16. In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely states how each party is to 
perform* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
17. In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely states what will happen in the case 
of events occurring that were not planned* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
18. When a tenderer offer a different solution that stands out from the other received 
offers , it complicates our evaluation procedure of the bids* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
19. In dealing with this supplier, our contract includes a detailed specification of the 
scope of work to be delivered* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
20. We always have a competitive tendering process before awarding a contract to this 
supplier* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
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Additional comments (if any): 
 
 
 
 
PART 2 
Think of one particular supplier  who has exhibited disappointing performance in relation to 
innovativeness (i.e., a supplier who has failed to contribute according to expectations) 
 
Think of one particular supplier that has shown excellent performance in product and process 
innovation when answering this section of the questionnaire. 
1. The level of technological capability the supplier possesses and is willing to use for 
our products is high* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
2. The supplier is willing to share key technological information* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
3. This supplier is capable of supporting collaborative processes in product development 
and process improvement* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
4. This supplier is frequently proactive in approaching us with innovations* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
5. The supplier's rewards are linked to the outcomes of the service delivered* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
6. We have agreed with our supplier upon performance bonuses on top of the regular 
payment schemes when performance levels exceeds targets* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
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7. The supplier is financially awarded for developing alternative/new ways of achieving 
the performance targets* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
8. This supplier has dedicated equipment, reserved equipment and reserved capacity 
specifically to maintain our purchasing relationship* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
9. This supplier has dedicated personnel to maintain our purchasing relationship* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
10. This supplier has purchased specialized equipment to meet our need for this key-input 
material* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
11. Competition in this supplier's industry is intense* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
12. Price competition is typical in this supplier's industry* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
13. Anything that this supplier can offer, competitors can match easily* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
14. In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely defines the role of each partner* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
15. In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely defines the responsibilities of each 
partner* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
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16. In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely states how each party is to 
perform* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
17. In dealing with this supplier, our contract precisely states what will happen in the case 
of events occurring that were not planned* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
18. When a tenderer offer a different solution that stands out from the other received 
offers , it complicates our evaluation procedure of the bids* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
19. In dealing with this supplier, our contract includes a detailed specification of the 
scope of work to be delivered* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
20. We always have a competitive tendering process before awarding a contract to this 
supplier* 
Strongly disagree  1     2     3     4     5     6    7     Strongly agree  
 
 
Additional comments (if any): 
 
 
 
* This question must be answered.  
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Appendix B – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Item1 92 1,00 7,00 4,9457 1,48520 -,748 ,251 -,337 ,498 
Item2 92 1,00 7,00 4,6196 1,53238 -,625 ,251 -,523 ,498 
Item3 92 1,00 7,00 4,6739 1,40727 -,558 ,251 -,619 ,498 
Item4 92 1,00 7,00 3,9674 1,66047 -,065 ,251 -,609 ,498 
Item5 92 1,00 7,00 3,7609 1,77510 -,098 ,251 -1,098 ,498 
Item6 92 1,00 7,00 2,4674 1,84838 1,088 ,251 -,121 ,498 
Item7 92 1,00 7,00 2,7500 1,78285 ,613 ,251 -,978 ,498 
Item8 92 1,00 7,00 4,0870 1,67498 -,355 ,251 -,924 ,498 
Item9 92 1,00 7,00 4,8804 1,66965 -,661 ,251 -,319 ,498 
Item10 92 1,00 7,00 3,8696 1,77416 -,172 ,251 -1,071 ,498 
Item11 92 1,00 7,00 5,3478 1,50044 -,697 ,251 -,272 ,498 
Item12 92 1,00 7,00 4,9457 1,73119 -,668 ,251 -,706 ,498 
Item13 92 1,00 7,00 4,5761 1,68532 -,332 ,251 -,893 ,498 
Item14 92 2,00 7,00 5,5217 1,31332 -,718 ,251 -,478 ,498 
Item15 92 2,00 7,00 5,5870 1,34370 -1,065 ,251 ,619 ,498 
Item16 92 2,00 7,00 5,4130 1,27660 -,692 ,251 -,426 ,498 
Item17 92 1,00 7,00 5,2717 1,43046 -,701 ,251 -,050 ,498 
Item18 92 1,00 7,00 4,6630 1,36902 -,442 ,251 -,256 ,498 
Item19 92 3,00 7,00 5,6957 1,29019 -,571 ,251 -,855 ,498 
Item20 92 1,00 7,00 5,4783 1,55823 -,983 ,251 ,178 ,498 
Valid N (listwise) 92         
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Appendix C - Factor Analysis 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Item1 1,000 ,755 
Item2 1,000 ,729 
Item3 1,000 ,766 
Item4 1,000 ,637 
Item5 1,000 ,496 
Item6 1,000 ,834 
Item7 1,000 ,799 
Item8 1,000 ,746 
Item9 1,000 ,767 
Item10 1,000 ,778 
Item11 1,000 ,691 
Item12 1,000 ,736 
Item14 1,000 ,834 
Item15 1,000 ,859 
Item16 1,000 ,789 
Item17 1,000 ,507 
Item19 1,000 ,462 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5,218 30,693 30,693 5,218 30,693 30,693 3,549 20,878 20,878 
2 2,446 14,388 45,081 2,446 14,388 45,081 2,864 16,845 37,723 
3 1,721 10,126 55,207 1,721 10,126 55,207 2,138 12,575 50,298 
4 1,481 8,710 63,917 1,481 8,710 63,917 2,100 12,352 62,649 
5 1,319 7,760 71,677 1,319 7,760 71,677 1,535 9,028 71,677 
6 ,853 5,015 76,692       
7 ,745 4,385 81,077       
8 ,596 3,508 84,584       
9 ,528 3,105 87,690       
10 ,453 2,662 90,352       
11 ,399 2,348 92,699       
12 ,313 1,839 94,538       
13 ,281 1,656 96,194       
14 ,216 1,268 97,461       
15 ,178 1,048 98,509       
16 ,145 ,854 99,363       
17 ,108 ,637 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 ,666 ,560 ,431 ,234 ,045 
2 -,651 ,379 ,248 ,544 -,275 
3 ,211 -,585 ,001 ,759 ,194 
4 -,166 ,376 -,388 ,128 ,815 
5 -,245 -,244 ,776 -,240 ,469 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Item1 ,667 ,180 -,472 ,172 -,158 
Item2 ,757 ,108 -,183 ,271 -,194 
Item3 ,628 ,334 -,470 ,187 -,064 
Item4 ,567 ,435 -,279 ,180 -,129 
Item5 ,181 ,185 ,618 -,214 ,029 
Item6 ,342 ,569 ,522 ,327 -,117 
Item7 ,311 ,574 ,521 ,113 -,296 
Item8 ,688 ,206 ,057 -,335 ,339 
Item9 ,508 ,125 -,173 -,199 ,651 
Item10 ,596 ,358 ,110 -,234 ,477 
Item11 ,165 -,371 ,242 ,619 ,291 
Item12 -,013 -,222 ,164 ,680 ,444 
Item14 ,753 -,445 ,126 -,137 -,186 
Item15 ,735 -,519 ,079 -,126 -,164 
Item16 ,655 -,552 ,175 -,143 -,068 
Item17 ,616 -,212 ,235 -,093 -,139 
Item19 ,460 -,471 -,029 ,167 -,015 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 5 components extracted. 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Item1 ,237 ,821 ,142 -,044 -,045 
Item2 ,398 ,721 ,097 ,178 ,100 
Item3 ,086 ,839 ,231 ,011 -,032 
Item4 ,037 ,744 ,183 ,212 -,062 
Item5 ,159 -,277 ,230 ,578 -,083 
Item6 -,058 ,253 ,071 ,855 ,172 
Item7 -,003 ,202 ,003 ,866 -,089 
Item8 ,308 ,221 ,741 ,192 -,129 
Item9 ,094 ,200 ,833 -,126 ,098 
Item10 ,109 ,201 ,807 ,273 -,017 
Item11 ,229 -,027 -,035 ,029 ,797 
Item12 -,051 -,040 ,020 -,020 ,855 
Item14 ,886 ,173 ,123 ,057 -,019 
Item15 ,905 ,161 ,110 -,027 ,012 
Item16 ,873 ,018 ,148 -,016 ,067 
Item17 ,647 ,126 ,141 ,228 -,009 
Item19 ,583 ,163 ,006 -,145 ,274 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
  
Appendix D - Reliability 
 
Supplier Innovativeness 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases 
Valid 92 100,0 
Excludeda 0 ,0 
Total 92 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,853 4 
 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item1 4,9457 1,48520 92 
Item2 4,6196 1,53238 92 
Item3 4,6739 1,40727 92 
Item4 3,9674 1,66047 92 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Item1 13,2609 15,096 ,734 ,796 
Item2 13,5870 15,102 ,699 ,810 
Item3 13,5326 15,636 ,733 ,799 
Item4 14,2391 14,997 ,623 ,846 
 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
18,2065 25,770 5,07642 4 
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Pay for Performance 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases 
Valid 92 100,0 
Excludeda 0 ,0 
Total 92 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,701 3 
 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item5 3,7609 1,77510 92 
Item6 2,4674 1,84838 92 
Item7 2,7500 1,78285 92 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Item5 5,2174 11,623 ,292 ,865 
Item6 6,5109 8,209 ,631 ,458 
Item7 6,2283 8,222 ,676 ,402 
 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
8,9783 18,307 4,27869 3 
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Close Supplier Relationship 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases 
Valid 92 100,0 
Excludeda 0 ,0 
Total 92 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,810 3 
 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item8 4,0870 1,67498 92 
Item9 4,8804 1,66965 92 
Item10 3,8696 1,77416 92 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Item8 8,7500 9,201 ,688 ,710 
Item9 7,9565 9,932 ,596 ,801 
Item10 8,9674 8,603 ,696 ,700 
 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
12,8370 18,995 4,35834 3 
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Competition 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases 
Valid 92 100,0 
Excludeda 0 ,0 
Total 92 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,593 2 
 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item11 5,3478 1,50044 92 
Item12 4,9457 1,73119 92 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Item11 4,9457 2,997 ,426 . 
Item12 5,3478 2,251 ,426 . 
 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
10,2935 7,462 2,73173 2 
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Detailed Contract 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases 
Valid 92 100,0 
Excludeda 0 ,0 
Total 92 100,0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,863 5 
 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Item14 5,5217 1,31332 92 
Item15 5,5870 1,34370 92 
Item16 5,4130 1,27660 92 
Item17 5,2717 1,43046 92 
Item19 5,6957 1,29019 92 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Item14 21,9674 17,768 ,825 ,797 
Item15 21,9022 17,276 ,854 ,788 
Item16 22,0761 18,357 ,790 ,807 
Item17 22,2174 19,930 ,521 ,877 
Item19 21,7935 21,418 ,464 ,885 
 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
27,4891 28,626 5,35035 5 
  
 
 
Appendix E - Descriptive Statistics for the Constructed Variables 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Supplier_innovativeness 92 1,00 7,00 4,5516 1,26911 -,612 ,251 -,357 ,498 
Pay_for_performance 92 1,00 6,67 2,9928 1,42623 ,634 ,251 -,293 ,498 
Close_supplier_relationship 92 1,00 7,00 4,2790 1,45278 -,437 ,251 -,599 ,498 
Competition 92 2,00 7,00 5,1467 1,36587 -,306 ,251 -,802 ,498 
Detailed_contract 92 3,00 7,00 5,4978 1,07007 -,492 ,251 -,519 ,498 
Valid N (listwise) 92         
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Appendix F - Correlations 
 
Correlations 
 Supplier_innovativ
eness 
Pay_for_performan
ce 
Close_supplier_rel
ationship 
Competition Detailed_contract 
Supplier_innovativeness 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,222* ,455** -,019 ,387** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,034 ,000 ,854 ,000 
N 92 92 92 92 92 
Pay_for_performance 
Pearson Correlation ,222* 1 ,270** -,006 ,095 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,034  ,009 ,955 ,368 
N 92 92 92 92 92 
Close_supplier_relationship 
Pearson Correlation ,455** ,270** 1 -,022 ,357** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,009  ,837 ,000 
N 92 92 92 92 92 
Competition 
Pearson Correlation -,019 -,006 -,022 1 ,152 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,854 ,955 ,837  ,149 
N 92 92 92 92 92 
Detailed_contract 
Pearson Correlation ,387** ,095 ,357** ,152 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,368 ,000 ,149  
N 92 92 92 92 92 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
  
Appendix G – Multiple Regression Analysis 1 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
Detailed_contract, 
Pay_for_performance, 
Competition, 
Close_supplier_relationshipb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Supplier_innovativeness 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 ,527a ,278 ,244 1,10321 ,278 8,356 4 87 ,000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Detailed_contract, Pay_for_performance, Competition, Close_supplier_relationship 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 40,681 4 10,170 8,356 ,000b 
Residual 105,886 87 1,217   
Total 146,567 91    
a. Dependent Variable: Supplier_innovativeness 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Detailed_contract, Pay_for_performance, Competition, 
Close_supplier_relationship 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1,545 ,736  2,101 ,039 
Pay_for_performance ,096 ,084 ,107 1,135 ,260 
Close_supplier_relationship ,287 ,088 ,329 3,252 ,002 
Competition -,048 ,086 -,052 -,564 ,574 
Detailed_contract ,316 ,117 ,267 2,694 ,008 
a. Dependent Variable: Supplier_innovativeness 
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Appendix H – Multiple Regression Analysis 2 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
Detailed_contract
, Competitionb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Close_supplier_relationship 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 ,365a ,133 ,114 1,36782 ,133 6,828 2 89 ,002 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Detailed_contract, Competition 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 25,548 2 12,774 6,828 ,002b 
Residual 166,513 89 1,871   
Total 192,062 91    
a. Dependent Variable: Close_supplier_relationship 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Detailed_contract, Competition 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2,051 ,958  2,141 ,035 
Competition -,099 ,134 -,073 -,738 ,462 
Detailed_contract ,497 ,135 ,366 3,683 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: Close_supplier_relationship 
 
